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ABSTRACT
With the American economy seemingly stalling, the global
economy thereby imperiled, and another electoral campaign
season well underway in the United States, the “outsourcing” of
jobs from the developed to the developing world is again on the
public agenda. Latest figures indicate not only that layoffs and
claims for joblessness benefits are up in the United States, but also
that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled
since the last electoral cycle. This year’s American political
candidates have been quick to take note. In consequence, more
than at any time since the early 1990s, continued American, and
with it other developed economies’, participation in the World
Trade Organization and processes of global economic integration
more generally appear to be up for grabs.
It is not clear, on reflection, how to regard these developments
from a normative point of view. On the one hand, there seems no
gainsaying the claim that the gradual removal of transnational
trade and investment barriers has resulted in a more rapid
economic growth worldwide. That growth appears to be lifting
many once desperately poor persons out of their erstwhile penury.
On the other hand, there is also no denying that global trade and
investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as
conspicuous as the gains. Many, if not most, of the victims of
globalization are those who until recently occupied positions much
like those that are coming to be occupied by globalization’s more
sympathetic beneficiaries, and who climbed out of them via
precisely such legislated standards as offshoring firms now evade.
Might we pay “Peter” without robbing “Paul”?
This Article proposes an ethically and intuitively attractive
answer to that question rooted in financial engineering. The key is
to channel a portion of the globalization-wrought gains reaped by
outsourcing firms to the outsourced employees themselves. This
way the latter are directly benefited by the very processes that
currently harm them. The method proposed is to adapt the
familiar Employee Stock Ownership Plan, or “ESOP,” to spread
firm-shares not simply to current labor, but to outsourced and
otherwise harmed “shadow” labor as well. The Article also
proposes means of diversifying the portfolio risk that will face
“OutsourceSOP” participants, and maps the supporting role apt to
be played by such globalization-constitutive financial institutions
as the IMF and the World Bank. In the long run, the Article urges,
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we have here the makings of a grander ambition that all the
world’s inhabitants can jointly support—a “Global Shareholder
Society.”
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1.

INTRODUCTION: THE QUANDARY OF ROBBED “PETER,” PAID
“PAUL,” & OVERPAID “MARY”

With the American economy seemingly stalling, the global
economy consequently imperiled, and another electoral campaign
season well underway in the United States, the “outsourcing” of
jobs from the developed to the developing world is again on the
public agenda. The latest figures indicate not only that layoffs and
claims for joblessness benefits are up in the United States, but also
that the rate of American job-exportation has more than doubled
since the last electoral cycle.1 Corroborative data concerning
resultant wage- and benefit-stagnation, as well as declining
workplace health and safety standards, now abounds.2 This year’s
American political candidates have been quick to take note: the
“middle class squeeze,” and the role of global trade and
investment liberalization therein, figure prominently in stump
speeches by candidates from both major U.S. political parties.
These issues are also the stuff of now nightly jeremiads by popular
news pundits on American cable news programs.3 More than at
1 See Morning Edition: Offshoring Doubles, But Political Focus on Retraining
Workers, (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 3, 2008) (discussing the phenomenon of
increased offshoring of jobs coupled with political reactions to the increase),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId= 87851332.
2 Id.
3 See, e.g., LOU DOBBS, WAR ON THE MIDDLE CLASS: HOW THE GOVERNMENT, BIG
BUSINESS, AND SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS ARE WAGING WAR ON THE AMERICAN
DREAM AND HOW TO FIGHT BACK (2006) (examining the negative impact of special
interest groups and other political organizations on the American middle class);
LOU DOBBS, EXPORTING AMERICA: WHY CORPORATE GREED IS SHIPPING AMERICAN
JOBS OVERSEAS (2004) (decrying the impact of free trade on the American middle
class). May God forgive me for citing these but they do appear to be
representative of a distinct and increasingly pronounced strain of the present day
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any time since the early 1990s, it seems, continued American
participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO), in the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and in the processes of
global economic integration more generally appear to be up for
grabs. The United States is but one developed country in which
public discourse is taking this turn.
It is not really clear, on reflection, how to regard these
developments from a normative point of view. Slogans aside,
global trade and investment liberalization present a genuine
quandary to those who are serious about justice and human wellbeing. On the one hand, there is no gainsaying the claim that the
gradual removal of transnational trade and investment barriers has
been resulting in more rapid economic growth worldwide,4 and
that growth appears to be lifting many once desperately poor
persons out of their erstwhile penury.5 All of this seems to be
happening, moreover, much in the way—pursuant, indeed, to the
very dynamic—that students of political economy since the
“classical” era of Smith, Ricardo, and Mill long have predicted:
freely moving investment capital and purchase orders increasingly
flow to those locales where they yield the highest returns on
investment and expenditure. This flow of capital and purchase
orders is raising the incomes of the once global poor, and is also
lowering the prices of many goods and services for which
everyone once paid much more.6
On the other hand, however, there is no denying that global
trade and investment liberalization are wreaking losses at least as
conspicuous as the gains: losses such as employment, declining
incomes and workplace standards, and associated dislocations in
the erstwhile “developed” economies.7 Crucially, these losses do
not accrue solely, mainly, or even noticeably, to complacent
plutocratic rascals of the sort long since fingered by Smith and his
“public choice” school descendants as being ever the principal
discourse on globalization.
4 See generally Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote (suggesting
solutions to systemic inequities in the new global economy).
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 One even encounters discussion, not only of deindustrialization, but of
backward movement along such venerable metrics of basic human development
as health, education, and even literacy in the United States, for example. See, e.g.,
id. Hence, one presumes, the popularity of such phrases as “trading places,” used
of the developed and developing economies.
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advocates of “protectionist” policies of all stripes.8 Rather, many, if
not most, of the “victims” of globalization today seem to be those
who until recently occupied positions much like those now coming
to be occupied by globalization’s more sympathetic beneficiaries—
and who indeed climbed out of their disadvantaged positions
through precisely such legislated labor, health, and safety
standards as offshoring firms now evade.9
It is precisely this that underwrites the quandary mentioned
above. For what are we to think of—how are we ethically to assess
and regard—a process that “robs,” so to speak, faultless “Peter” to
pay faultless “Paul”? Symmetrically, what do we make of a status
quo ante that kept faultless “Paul” in his poverty while benefiting
faultless “Peter”? And finally, how, if at all, should our assessment
be altered if “Peter” is robbed not only to pay “Paul,” but less
sympathetic, rich “Mary” as well?
Now one might suggest various means by which to address the
dilemma—what we might call “the assessment dilemma.” One
family of such means in particular has been favored, historically,
by many mainstream economists and policy advocates since at
least Bentham’s day: this theory suggests that we seek means of
commensurating the gains and the losses accruing to “Peters,”
“Pauls,” and “Marys,” then choose such policies as yield the
greatest net gains or least losses. Relatedly, and now heuristically
more conveniently, one might propose fixing on some readymade
index—such as global GDP—then select policies best calculated to
“maximize” it. One then labels policies that maximize aggregates
of this sort “efficient,” yielding “more bang”—more aggregate
benefit—for “the buck”—the same or lower cost. It is actually
quite remarkable, on reflection, how many contributors to public
discussion of globalization—and indeed of public policy more
generally—adopt points of view of this general type.10
8 See generally Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (discussing how the IMF,
the World Bank, and the GATT/WTO can, and should, promote equal treatment
and market completion).
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Hockett, Limits, supra headnote (reviewing and critiquing a treatise
on international law that details the prominence of state actors in a global society).
For more of the aforementioned “reflection,” see Hockett, Three Pillars, supra
headnote; Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote; Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging,
supra headnote. See also Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A MetaTheory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, The Deep
Grammar of Distribution] (examining common schemes within numerous
distribution theories); Robert Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously (Cornell Legal
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It is exceedingly doubtful, however, that proffered approaches
to the assessment dilemma of this species are apt to prove
satisfactory for long, either prudentially or ethically speaking. For
as a prudential matter, perceivedly “robbed,” faultless “Peters”
cannot plausibly be expected to acquiesce in their “robbery”
indefinitely, simply because some of the spoils assist “Pauls.” At
least this seems so given the “Peters’” own recent history of
struggle to win wealth shares from less sympathetic and no more
deserving rich “Marys,” who presently appear to be benefiting
along with—and, crucially, even more than—the “Pauls” at the
“Peters’” expense.11 Political developments underway in the
United States and other developed economies, mentioned in the
opening paragraphs above, appear to bear out this prudential
prognostication.12
But even more importantly than prudential considerations
here, as an ethical matter it would seem neither the “Peters” who
have been robbed through no fault of their own, nor anyone else
rightfully can accept, without alteration or emendation, a
systematic
transfer—a
regressive
redistribution—from
hypothetically faultless “Peters” to undeserving “Marys.” At least
that is so if the “Peters” are truly faultless and the “Marys” are
truly “undeserving,” and if some workable, ameliorative alteration
lies to hand.13 If the antecedent conditions obtain—that is, if the

Stud. Res., Paper No. 08-004, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1108217 [hereinafter Hockett, Taking Distribution
Seriously]; Robert Hockett, The Impossibility of a Prescriptive Paretian (Cornell Legal
Stud. Res., Paper No. 06-027, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cmf?abstract_id=930460; Robert Hockett, Why Paretians Can’t Prescribe:
Preferences, Principles and Imperatives in Law and Policy (Cornell Legal Stud. Res.,
Paper No. 08-028, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1266270.
11 See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (describing how the Bretton
Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank, have fallen short of their
potential to bring about a just world economic order); Hockett, Global MacroHedging, supra headnote, at 114 (setting forth proposals for “more just and
efficient systemic income-risk-sharing” among employers and employees).
12 So would the growing chorus of anti-WTO protests worldwide, and also
the protectionist backlash of the 1930s—forebear to the postwar Bretton Woods
institutions themselves. See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote (restating
many criticisms of the Bretton Woods institutions and the failure of the global
market to promote global economic justice).
13 Id. (discussing the question of agency on the part of beneficiaries and
victims of global markets, and proposing a role for international financial
institutions to undertake in pursuit of distributive justice).
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“Peters” are faultless and the “Marys” are less than deserving and
are merely the beneficiaries of windfalls—then transfers from the
former to the latter are, simply, unjust. By definition, it is wrongful
to tolerate, let alone foment, remediable injustice.
This Article accordingly aims to propose and discuss one
possible method of remediation that seems open to us—all of us
sharing the globe. It proposes that we add a bit of financial
“irrigation” to the processes of global trade and investment
liberalization. The object is a set of financial arrangements that rechannel some of the gains that those mentioned processes
presently channel away from the “Peters” to already advantaged
“Marys,” back to those recently and now seemingly again
disadvantaged “Peters.” Insofar as they do so, they not only
remediate injustice, thus realizing the end that this Article sets for
them, but also realize this end by means that are apt, in contrast to
garden variety taxation and redistribution policies, to resonate in
an intuitively satisfactory way with the ethical commitments and
endowment dispositions that all of us—”Peters,” “Pauls,” and
“Marys” alike—seem to share.14 Hence they seem optimally to
accommodate both ethical and prudential desiderata.
We can think of this Article’s proposed arrangements as
financial “bypass surgery,” so to speak—a bit of added arterial
flow to afford globalization a healthier heart. If the metaphor is
apt, it will mean that continued trade and investment liberalization
can be made to benefit “Pauls” in a manner that does not rob
“Peters” or “Marys.” That will be globalization that gives rise to
less ambiguous justice- and wealth-gains, hence globalization
which all of us who share the globe can get behind and endorse.
Indeed, it will be more. For the particular arrangements proposed
here are such as to make all of us part owners in all of the world’s
largest—its globe-straddling—firms. They are such as to make of
us a global shareholder society.
“Smoke and mirrors?,” some might now be asking. Well, no:
finance. Or more to the point: financial engineering. The key to
solving both our ethical assessment dilemma and our current
14 “Endowment dispositions” refers to certain behavioral-psychological
tendencies that behavioral economists and legal scholars have in recent years
documented extensively. I will elaborate, as well as endeavor to substantiate the
claims I have just made. See infra Sections 3 and 4 (elaborating on “endowment
dispositions” and the means by which distribution goals ought to be
accomplished). See also Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote (exploring the
theoretical structure of ownership in an equal-opportunity society).
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political stalemate over globalization is to channel some shares in
“Mary’s” trade- and investment-benefited firms to the laboring
“Peters” whom crossborder trade and investment increasingly
tend to displace. If globalization disemploys faultless “Peter,” that
is to say, and if only lesser paying jobs subsequently remain to be
had even after aging “Peter” “retools,” then we can make “Peter”
part-owner of the firm that has displaced or discarded him. That
way everyone not only wins, but wins in a way that is just as
immediately intuitively—i.e., endowment-psychologically15—as it
is ethically attractive. Indeed it is a way that takes concrete and
straightforward steps toward realizing a hope that seems implicitly
to have underwritten countless denunciations of “globalization”
since the dawn of the modern era over two centuries ago.16 Such is
the prospect this Article explores.
The Article proceeds, then, as follows: Section 2 first fleshes
out in more detail who is meant here by “Peters,” “Pauls,” and
“Marys,” as well as what is meant by “robbed,” “faultless,”
“deserving,” and “undeserving” in characterizing these
personages. This serves to sharpen the quandary to which this
Introduction has been referring—the assessment dilemma. It also
serves to highlight some premises that appear to underwrite that
quandary—premises that empirical work can serve either partly or
fully to corroborate or falsify.17
Section 3 then elaborates the structure of a familiar sharespreading prototype from which this Article’s proposal less
familiarly, but straightforwardly, extends—the employee stock
ownership plan, or ESOP. The ESOP, as it happens, is woefully
inadequate to the task for which it was originally embraced by the
United Kingdom Parliament and the United States Congress—the
provision of income security to U.K. and U.S. laborers. However,
the financial structure of the ESOP, and that structure’s resonance
15 “Endowment psychology” here refers to such familiar “behaviouralist”
heuristics as loss-aversion—interpretive dispositions with which the proposals
herein make accommodation. See infra Section 3.
16 See, e.g., AMIYA KUMAR BAGCHI, PERILOUS PASSAGE: MANKIND AND THE
GLOBAL ASCENDANCY OF CAPITAL (2005) (challenging a Eurocentric view of
economic history that minimizes the interests and activities of non-European
players and portrays globalization as necessarily a zero-sum game).
17 The proposal can accordingly be taken for conditional in nature: if the
premises drawn out in Section 2 are correct—which may be plausible but there is
no space here to do more than partly corroborate this assertion—then the proposal
would seem attractive.
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with a number of deep-seated justice intuitions and behavioralpsychological dispositions of the sort mentioned above,18 hold at
least one strong attraction―they render the ESOP a politically ideal
template from which to extend when we seek means of channeling
a share of the capital gains currently realized by firm owners who
benefit by trade and investment liberalization, to laborers now
faultlessly being displaced by the same.
Sections 4 and 5 carry out the project of analogical extension
just described in two steps. Section 4 shows how readily the ESOP
form can be varied simply by varying the patronage relations
which both essentially define and ethically underwrite it.19 Section
5 then shows how readily laborers’ displacement by globalizationfacilitated outsourcing can stand in as an ethically and
endowment-intuitively compelling “shadow” form of patronage.
If this is right, then we have here an elegant means both of
addressing the assessment dilemma with which our discussion
here has opened, and of winning more stakeholders in, and
supporters of, globalization than it seems apt to keep should
today’s trends continue.
Section 6 then briefly treats of the central coordinating role that
the international financial institutions (IFIs) both can and should
take in facilitating, and perhaps even administering, such
programs as those proposed in Section 5.20 For, Section 6
maintains, programs of this sort are not only programs in respect
of which the IFIs bear comparative advantage. They also, and not
Supra note 11, and accompanying text.
By “patronage” I mean simply a sustained mode of relation between
persons and firms. See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE
(1996) (enumerating different patterns of ownership of firms favored within
different industries and nations); infra Section 4. In the case of ESOPs, labor is the
salient form of patronage. But see infra Section 4 (arguing that there are other
forms of patronage, including faultlessly lost employment on the part of those
lacking in “retooling” opportunity).
20 The principal IFIs we will consider are the International Monetary Fund
(“Fund,” IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(“World Bank,” “Bank,” IBRD). But much that Section 6 sets forth carries over to
the missions of other IFIs, including the International Finance Corporation (IFC),
the African Development Bank (ADB), the Asian Development Bank (ABD), the
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Like remarks apply to the Group of
Eight (G8), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), and other constituent institutions of the so-called “New International
Financial Architecture” (NIFA). On the latter, as well as the mentioned
institutions, see Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote; infra Section 6.
18
19
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accidentally, are precisely the sort of fare for which the IFIs—the
Bretton Woods IFIs in particular—are designed in their
globalization-complementary roles.21 Indeed, Section 6 argues,
facilitating such programs as these would confer on the IMF and
the World Bank roles relative to their earlier missions analogous to
that of the WTO relative to its stillborn forebear, the International
Trade Organization (ITO) envisaged in the post Second World War
founding era.22
The Conclusion then briefly addresses anticipated objections
and looks forward.
2.

THE QUANDARY SHARPENED AND DIAGNOSED, AND A SOLUTION
PROPOSED

In order to render the considerations that prompt the proposals
below more fully appreciable, it will be helpful first briefly to
identify, in more detail, the precise sources of the assessment
dilemma described in the Introduction. For there appear to be
several widely held assumptions that lurk in the background of
much debate over globalization. These seem in turn not only to
underwrite the quandary itself, but to point toward the best means
of addressing the same.
The first assumption is that there is, “out there in the world,” a
global endowment of “primal stuff,” or of what we might
somewhat more preciously call “ethically exogenous resources.”23
These are things nobody has produced and thus no one can claim

21 See Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote (exploring the intended
role of the Bretton Woods IFIs).
22 Infra Section 6 (arguing that the International Trade Organization’s
envisioned role may be carried out by a reinvented IMF and World Bank). See also
Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote (defending the IMF’s departure from its
stated mandate in dealing with Asian financial crises in the late 1990s).
23 This is what I call them in the sources cited supra headnote. Some call
them “luck,” some “advantage,” some “resources.” See, e.g., Hockett, Three Pillars,
supra headnote, at 111. Another name for them that has been proposed elsewhere
is “material opportunity.” All of these variants work, but they bear the weakness
of suggesting that the user of the term is unaware that some resources,
advantages, etc. are themselves the product of responsible action on the part of
the beneficiary, in which case they are ethically endogenous and not the sort of
thing that concerns us here. See PETER DRUCKER, THE PENSION FUND REVOLUTION
(1996).
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credit for or ultimate ethical title to. They jointly add up to a sort
of “primal given,” a substrate of basic resources from which other
things valued by human beings are made.24
Informally and intuitively, we might at first pass think of this
global “stuff” as including inert and insipid material substances
like petroleum, natural gas, coal, copper, gold, magnesium—all
manner of useful hence valued materials to which no one initially
has any more legal or ethical claim than has anyone else. At next
pass, moving outward from heuristically easy examples like those,
we can enrich the description of “global stuff” by including what
might be called “cultural deposits.” Here we refer to accumulated
knowledge, practical know-how, even the languages in which we
generally think and through which we communicate.25
All things that have been left us by our forebears, which none
of us has produced and yet many of us derive value from—hence
to which none of us bears any more prior ethical claim than she can
assert in respect of newly discovered mineral wealth—would
count as cultural deposits of this kind. These deposits too, one
suspects, tend implicitly to be viewed as what we are calling
ethically exogenous. Their possession or otherwise is a matter of
brute luck. From a normative point of view, they no more
properly belong to one person than to another prior to anyone’s
responsible, value-adding behavior. Access to such forms of
wealth owes more to good fortune in the “birth lottery” than to
any form of creditably virtuous, value-additive activity.
Now if it is plausible to partition things in this way—to
maintain that there is some such stock of ethically exogenous yet
widely valued “stuff” to which no one bears ethical claims prior to
anyone else’s—then it seems fair to suppose something else: it
seems sensible to maintain that every human person—all of us
who share the globe, everyone who is an appropriate subject of our
ethical concern—is entitled in justice to an equal pro rata share of
this stock. That seems a straightforward consequence of our belief
that all people are, ethically speaking, created equal—that is to say,
24 Hillel Steiner has an evocative name for it, calling it the “global fund.” See
HILLEL STEINER, AN ESSAY ON RIGHTS 270 (1994).
25 A remarkably illuminating discussion of the global advantages conferred
by birth into a language community is found in DAVID SINGH GREWAL, NETWORK
POWER AND GLOBAL ARCHITECTURE: THE SOCIAL DYNAMICS OF GLOBALIZATION
(forthcoming from Yale University Press, 2008).
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that all are equally entitled to our ethical concern. For such
concern surely must include concern that persons bear access to the
physical stuff of which successful, well-faring lives are built up.26
Call it “real,” “material,” or “substantive” concern, as
distinguished from merely “abstract” or “formal” concern.
In the case of that portion of “stuff” for the existence of which
no one now living is responsible, equal material concern of the
kind just mentioned must surely amount to concern for material
equality: that is to say, equality of access to ethically exogenous
resources and opportunity.27 And this, one suspects, is the second
working assumption that many people attempting to think
through the ethical significance of global trade and investment
liberalization operate under. We tend to think intuitively of all
human beings as bearing, by way of birthright, a right to equal
opportunity—not just formal opportunity, but “substantive,”
material opportunity as well. Hence we view all human beings as
bearing equal claims to whatever resources are out there that
nobody now living is actually creditable with having responsibly
brought into existence.28 This is just part of what it is, ethically
speaking, for all of us who share the globe to regard one another as
equally human, equally deserving of ethical regard, equal in
justice. The first two assumptions are ethical-theoretic in nature.
They are grounded in widely-shared principle, which do not
appeal to “facts on the ground.”29 The remaining assumptions, by
contrast, involve empirical elements as well as theoretical ones.
The third assumption is that the endowment of global “stuff,”
referred to per the first assumption, is not actually distributed
equally in the pro rata manner described per the second
assumption. It is not the case that every person actually holds her
rightful pro rata share of the world’s ethically exogenous
resources. Some people are born into wealthy countries possessed
of abundant natural or even cultural resources, where the
continuing in rem jurisdiction or title is largely enshrined in
26 The claim here is not that such stuff is the sole “input” to well-faring, or
“welfare,” but simply that these items are among such inputs—that physical items
are one of the foundational aspects of human well-being or welfare.
27 For more on this, see Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 10.
28 “The Creator has bestowed this manna upon all of us,” one might say in a
more venerable idiom.
29 See Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 10 and Hockett,
Three Pillars, supra headnote, for more on the near-universality of these ethical
postulates.
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international law.30 Others are born into wealthy families whose
familial wealth is protected—and nowadays decreasingly taxed—
under domestic property, tort, and even constitutional legal
arrangements.31 Still other people are faultlessly born without such
advantages, perhaps even born with severe handicaps, for which
neither domestic nor international law require or afford
compensation.32
Insofar as all of this is the case, there are people in the world
with more than, as well as people in the world with less than, their
apparently rightful pro rata shares of the ethically exogenous
global endowment per the first two assumptions. Hence, there is a
gap between our ethical “ought” intuitions and our present day
“is” circumstances. So runs the third implicit assumption.
Further specification of this third assumption yields the fourth
assumption. One can partition all persons entitled to our equal
ethical concern into four subclasses.33 Call the first class the
“Ones.” The “Ones” are those who, per the second and third
assumptions, hold more than their ethically required pro rata
shares. They hold more than what they actually bear rights to
hold, per the second assumption, of the ethically exogenous
“stuff.” Perhaps they are born to rich families, born in rich
countries, or both. They simply are lucky, favored by accident or
fortune relative to others, and often protected in their exclusive
enjoyment of such favor by law.
Lest the point here be misunderstood, it is important to
emphasize what is not being suggested. To be sure, much—even
very much—of any given “One’s” surplus over the equal resource
baseline might owe to his own laudably responsible, valueadditive efforts. Hence much, even most, of a particular “One’s”
surplus might be ethically regarded as properly, in justice,

30 See generally Hockett, Limits, supra headnote (reviewing a treatise on
international law that discussed state actors and their strategies, and relative
differences in the distribution of assets among individuals).
31 Id.
32 It could be argued that the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and, more strongly, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights enshrine such norms. But thus far neither the Declaration nor the
Covenant appear to have been widely read—or at any rate vindicated by state
action—in so fulsome a manner. See id. It is to be hoped—and advocated—that
matters on this score will change.
33 For some purposes, three would suffice; for others, five or more might be
preferable. This will be developed later in the Article.
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belonging to him. The point here is simply that not all of it does in
the case of the “Ones” as a whole. Yet, some of these “Ones” have
ethically exogenous holdings exceeding their pro rata entitlement.
The remaining classes of persons pursuant to the third
assumption can quickly be characterized relative to the first. The
second class, call them “Twos,” hold roughly their rightful pro rata
shares—not substantially more and not substantially less. Then
there is another class, “Threes,” who hold substantially, but
perhaps not dramatically, less than their rightful pro rata shares.
And finally there are those—the “Fours”—who hold much less than
their rightful shares of the global endowment. If born into and
confined to particularly arid environments, or violent and
impoverished ghettos, or enclosed refugee camps, some “Fours”
(the reader could even call them “Fives”) might indeed be down
near to “zero,” so to speak. Such “Fours” are deprived of sufficient
basic resources required to sustain recognizably human lives.34
And if born with severe handicaps they might even be thought—
depending upon whether we account genetically transmitted
“human resources” among the world’s ethically exogenous
resources—to be “negatively” endowed, marked for death or
profound suffering absent medical intervention.35
Thus runs the fourth assumption. It is simply that none of the
just-defined classes—neither the “Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” nor
“Fours”—are null.36 To sum up, there are some who hold more
than they have earned, others who hold more or less what they
have earned, and still others who hold less than—in some cases
dramatically less than—that which in fairness they rightfully
deserve.
Finally, there appear to be three further, more quickly
characterizable, assumptions under which many who experience
our mentioned quandary tend to operate when thinking about
global trade and investment liberalization. The fifth assumption is
that the class of “Ones” is roughly coextensive with the class of
significant residual claimants upon, and creditors of, business
34 A presently salient group of actual “Fours” (or even “Fives”) might be
those confined to the refugee camps of Darfur, for example.
35 Insofar as handicaps are genetic and undeserved, it seems sensible to think
of them as resource-deficits in this sense. See Hockett, Taking Distribution
Seriously, supra note 10 (analyzing the legal and policy aspects of distribution of
social welfare).
36 The “Twos” could drop out of the account without loss to the principal
thrust of the argument, for reasons that will shortly become clear.
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firms. The “Ones” largely coincide with the class of large-scale
shareholders and holders of high-valued quantities of debt
securities issued by firms. They are, by and large, substantial
owners of and lenders to firms.37 A safe corollary assumption
would be that significant portions of these people’s portfolios are
inherited or otherwise plausibly regarded as windfalls; but we will
see that no such corollary is necessary to what this Article will be
arguing.38
The sixth, and related, assumption is that the classes of “Twos”
and “Threes,” together, are roughly coextensive with the class of
minimal-shareholding or non-shareholding. They are generally
either white collar salary-earning, or union-scale blue collar wageearning, workers for firms headquartered or substantially
operating in countries with advanced economies. These people,
particularly the high-waged and salary-earning, have for the most
part been born into, and raised in, the generally nurturing
environments of well-to-do households and neighborhoods. They
have also enjoyed access to good educations, healthy
environments, and well functioning societies, this assumption
would run.39 They accordingly possess much in the way of well
developed “human capital,” “cultural capital,” and “social capital.”

37 For extensive empirical corroboration of this point, and graphic illustration
of how comparatively few (in the neighborhood of five percent of) people hold so
comparatively large percentage (over ninety) of corporate securities in the United
States for example, see Hockett, Of ESOPs, supra headnote, at 897–912. Such
figures, released annually by the U.S. Federal Reserve, among other compilers,
might temper some of the more extravagant claims one sometimes hears in the
States, to the effect that the United States is already possessed of an “equity
culture.” This Article, along with its predecessors cited above in the headnote,
can accordingly be viewed in part as prompted by a hope to bring the United
States, and the world economy more generally, into closer approximation to that
ideal which some seem to think is already realized.
38 There
is substantial statistical evidence to the effect that the
overwhelmingly greater part of corporate securities—both equity and debt
instruments—held by Americans is inherited. See infra, Section 4; Hockett, Of
ESOPs?, supra headnote, at 873–90 (discussing the concentrated nature of
securities ownership in the United States).
39 Again, the point here is not that there are not many people who have
lacked in some of these advantages and nevertheless made successes of their lives.
The point is simply that there are many who have built such successes on the
basis of good background conditions but little if any inherited business capital.
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But they possess dramatically less than the “Ones” when it comes
to inherited financial capital—creditor and ownership interests in
firms.40
The seventh, final, and again related assumption is that the
class of “Fours” (even “Fives,” if such there be) is roughly
coextensive with the class of very low-wage earners, often or
persistently unemployed, as well as subsistence agriculturists
worldwide. The vast majority of these people, moreover, inhabit
economically underdeveloped countries without much access to
valuable material resources, inherited wealth, or even effective
political, economic, and social infrastructures or educational and
other institutions. “Social capital” and “cultural capital” are as
scarce or as poorly distributed as is “natural capital” in the
precincts inhabited by “Fours.” And so, in consequence, is
“human capital” too.41
The seven assumptions just elaborated give rise to this Article’s
opening quandary of Peter, Paul, and Mary. If the assumptions are
at least partly correct, then global trade and investment
liberalization will bear the following curious attributes. First, they
will tend to most immediately benefit the “Ones” and the
“Fours”—in particular, the “Fours” in those economically lesser
developed jurisdictions where, by hypothesis, most of the “Fours”
live. For the firms owned and lent to by “Ones” are the first
beneficiaries of trade and investment liberalization.42 And the
benefits, realized largely because of the hiring of desperate “Fours”
willing to work in unregulated environments for low wages, go

40 The assumption here would not rule out non-negligible stock-holding and
bond-holding—direct, indirect, or beneficial—by “Twos” and “Threes.” The
assumption simply argues that these groups’ ownership and creditor stakes are
very much less than are those of the “Ones.” For empirical corroboration of this
suspicion, as well as specification of what “direct,” “indirect,” and “beneficial”
firm-owning are, please see infra, Section 4; Hockett, Of ESOPs?, supra headnote,
at 873–85.
41 See Hockett, Of ESOPs?, supra headnote, at 873–85 (comparing the value of
stocks held by “Ones” to the relatively low value of stocks held by “Twos” and
“Threes”); see also Hockett, Jeffersonian Republics, supra headnote (promoting the
ideals of an “ownership society”).
42 See Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (detailing how the IMF and the
Bank worked towards equitable distribution in the aftermath of the Argentine and
Asian financial crises); see also Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote
(arguing that despite global market liberalization there is a disparity in profit
distribution).
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immediately to “Ones.” If that is correct, then the “Ones” are those
called the “Marys” in the Introduction, and the “Fours” are the
paid “Pauls.”
Second, if the assumptions are correct, trade and investment
liberalization will tend to benefit the “Ones” and the “Fours” at the
immediate expense of the “Twos” and the “Threes”—particularly
those in economically well developed jurisdictions where, by
hypothesis, most of the “Twos” and “Threes” live. For as firms
realize growing profits by avoiding the labor, environmental, and
other regulatory standards that once constrained them in the
developed jurisdictions,43 the formerly salaried and higher-waged
officers and other employees of these firms—”Twos” and
“Threes”—begin to lose increments of salary, wage, and other
benefits. And these latter were won, not many decades ago,
through precisely such domestic labor and employee benefit
legislation as globalization now enables the firms—and the “Ones”
who own and finance them—to evade.44 So the “Twos” and the
“Threes” will be those labeled “Peters” in the Introduction. They
now largely finance the gains realized by the “Pauls” and the
“Marys.”45
But if all of this is so, then it means that global trade and
investment liberalization as presently conceived and executed are
inherently ethically ambiguous, perhaps even altogether
indeterminate. And it is precisely this ambiguity, it is hard not to
suspect, that ultimately accounts for the difficulty described in the
Introduction—the quandary that many of us worldwide tend to
experience in attempting to determine whether globalization is a
good thing, and thus what kinds of conditions, if any, should be
superimposed upon any would-be continued, sustainable course of
trade and investment liberalization.
Here, more precisely, is the fundamental problem: Insofar as it
is possible to restrict comparison to “Ones” on the one hand and
43 It would happen, of course, in any of several familiar ways: firms in the
developed world would outsource or threaten to outsource to less regulated
jurisdictions. Firms in the developing and less regulated world, for their parts,
would export to the once-regulated developed world, and would do so cheaply
by dint of the costs saved via non-regulation. And the latter course strengthens
the force of the former course. See id.
44 I am ignoring longer-term “rising tides lift all boats” type claims for the
moment.
45 See generally sources cited in supra headnote.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/2

2008]

GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER SOCIETY

119

“Twos” and/or “Threes” on the other, simply leaving “Fours” out
of account in a sort of ethical blind spot, there appears to be a
straightforward ethical loss in the case of global trade and
investment liberalization. At least that is so in the short term, and
probably it is so for the long term as well, in view of individuals’
“retooling” costs and the relatively brief length of a working life.46
If one fails to consider the “Fours”—that is, ignore the desperately
poor, most of whom operate outside of the advanced economies—
it seems pretty clear that globalization is altogether a bad thing, for
we are benefiting the “Ones” at the expense of the “Twos” and the
“Threes.” And, by hypothesis—per the assumptions elaborated
above—the “Ones” are already over-endowed, the “Twos” are at
best adequately endowed, and the “Threes” are under-endowed.
So redistributing from the “Twos” and the “Threes” to the “Ones”
yields a straightforward justice-loss.
It is tempting to suspect that many opponents of trade and
investment liberalization, at least those who oppose it without any
misgivings, think along these lines. Yet they may not consider the
“Fours,” who are often in an ethical blind spot, rendering it easy to
suppose globalization to be unambiguously wrongful.47
Now, if by contrast, one restricts comparison to the “Twos”
and/or “Threes” on the one hand and the “Fours” on the other,
leaving the “Ones” out of account in the ethical blind spot, then one
faces the prospect of an unambiguous sort of justice gain wrought
by global trade and investment liberalization. For the “degree” of
global injustice—the justice-shortfall, as one might call it—can be
viewed in this case as now being partly made up. Ethically
exogenous global “stuff” is more nearly equalized between
“Twos,” “Threes,” and “Fours;” whereas before, the “Twos” were
by dint of mere luck better off than the “Threes,” who by dint of
mere luck were better off than the “Fours.” Looking again at the
“Ones,” this new distribution—which, again, is the hypothetically
ethical equalization of ethically exogenous global “stuff”—will
46 See, e.g., Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote (discussing the
effects of global market liberalization on the global economic order).
47 It might also be argued, of course, that they ignore the lowering of prices,
which benefits “everybody.” This argument is weak precisely because “everyone”
benefits in this sense. The benefit here is quite thinly spread, whereas the harms
that these people are concerned about are quite thickly concentrated—on
precisely the wrong people. He who loses his income and cannot retool is not
consoled by the fact that his poisonous toothpaste or his child’s toxic toy now will
cost pennies less.
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appear as a straightforward justice-gain.
Just as it is the “Fours” who appear to be forgotten by those
who view globalization as unambiguously wrongful, so it seems to
be “Ones” who are forgotten by those who view globalization as
straightforwardly salutary—all those who say, simply, “think
about all those desperate global poor who have jobs now.” These
people are of course partly right: one should be thinking about the
desperate global poor—the “Fours.” But the “Ones” are left out of
the account in this case. Yet they can no more rightfully be left out
of account in this case than can “Fours,” if what ought to be all of
the justice-accounting is to be complete. And this is, of course, the
root of the assessment dilemma described in the Introduction.
If this is correct, then all who share the globe are faced with
both a challenge of vision and, yet more urgently, a challenge of
action. For if the just-proffered diagnosis is correct, then the only
way to adequately and usefully address the quandary would seem
to require a two-fold epistemic and programmatic approach. First,
epistemically speaking, one must keep all relevant parties—the
“Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and “Fours”—simultaneously in view
when assessing, structuring, or rerouting the course of global trade
and investment liberalization.
Second, programmatically
speaking, one must seek means of ensuring that “Ones” but not
“Fours” share the gains wrought by the windfalls of trade and
investment liberalization with “Twos” and, especially, “Threes.”
Note that the second task is in a sense more urgent than the
first. That is because, unless one can find means by which the
“Ones” share their gains with the “Twos” and the “Threes,” there
seems no way of acting at all upon the first task. Successful
resolution of the epistemic problem here, it seems, depends upon
resolution of the practical problem. Until we discharge the second
task, that is, it appears we shall never escape the assessment
dilemma. For the latter amounts to a case of ethical indeterminacy
wrought by incomplete specification of the assessment domain,
while the assessment domain seems completable only by practical
measures that actually link “Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and
“Fours.” Absent a practical linkage of all, either the “Ones” or the
“Fours” are missing from one horn of our ethical dilemma. And
there seems no way to determinately adjudge, under the aspect of
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justice, when a justice gain wrought by transfers from “Twos” or
“Threes” to “Fours” is swamped by a justice-loss wrought by
simultaneous transfers from “Twos” or “Threes” to “Ones.”48
Unless, then, we design practical means of connecting global
“Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and Fours, in our ethical assessments
we are effectively attempting to deal with a trivalent ethical
problem by means of a two-variable formula.49 Only by adding a
variable does one render the problem soluble. And only in that
way, accordingly, is it possible to ensure that globalization might
constitute a straightforward ethical gain. The pressing normativetheoretical problem that is the assessment dilemma, that is,
appears to be soluble only by practical means. One must embark
on a project of institutional design.50
It is tempting to think, per this last observation, that there is
some of the requisite “connective tubing” at hand. The institutions
that must be designed are financial in nature. The task is one of
financial engineering: financial engineering on behalf not simply of
large firms in this case, but also on behalf of ordinary folk—
”Twos” and “Threes”—as well. The remainder of this Article will
undertake to unpack and elaborate upon that suggestion. The key
is to start with a familiar means by which the United Kingdom and
the United States already endeavor to make “capital” owners of
“laborers,” to employ the classical terminology, and then to adapt
the structure to our present purpose. This Article will do that in
48 One might seek to escape the prescriptive indeterminacy by falling back
upon a maximizing rule, of course, as countenanced above in the Introduction;
but then one will have relinquished the effort to conform one’s prescriptions to
what is distributively just.
49 Trivalent because, for the purposes of assessing the transfers, “Twos” and
“Threes” can be lumped together as those whose holding of the global
endowment of ethically exogenous “stuff” is just about right. It is the “Ones” and
the “Fours” who are the real “outliers”―those with much more and much less,
respectively, of their pro rata entitlements. The “two-valued formulae,” then, are:
“Ones” as compared to “Twos-and-Threes” in the case of those who
unequivocally decry globalization, “Twos-and-Threes” as compared to “Fours” in
the case of those who univocally defend it.
50 The fuller significance of institutional design as means of more adequately
addressing normative-theoretical problems is discussed fully in Hockett, Taking
Distribution Seriously, supra note 10. This role of the practical in solving even
theoretical problems should not be surprising when it is normative theory that is
under consideration. For normative theory is always at bottom about action.
Normative theory is a species of what since Aristotle’s day we have called
“practical reason.”
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Sections 3 through 5. Section 6 will then seek to explain why the
proposal amounts to an ideal means by which the Bretton Woods
IFIs can play precisely that WTO-complementary role which the
founders of all three institutions envisaged well over sixty-odd
years ago.51
3.

A SUGGESTIVE BUT INCOMPLETE PROTOTYPE: THE EMPLOYEE
STOCK OWNERSHIP PLAN

Intriguingly and indeed promisingly, Americans and Britons
have made some tentative efforts at making capital-owners of
laborers. The principal means up to now has been the public
favoring—mainly the tax-favoring—of employee benefit plans. In
the United States, that is done via the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (“ERISA”).52 Yet the ultimate aim, as ERISA’s
full title suggests, has been mainly to encourage and protect
investment for one limited purpose: retirement security.53
There is one partial exception, however: The employee stock
ownership plan (“ESOP”), was originally designed, and continues
to be advocated, at least partly as a means to foster the preretirement owning of firms by employees. For a number of reasons
described elsewhere in the Article, and that many others have also
explained, that is an over-modest aim.54 But here the concern will

51 This Article treats the WTO as the embodiment, more or less, of what the
Bretton Woods founders envisaged for the then-planned ITO, which had to wait
50 years for its effective implementation. See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro to
“Mission Creep,” supra headnote (discussing international schema created in
response to global financial crises).
52 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, codified at 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (2000) et seq. [hereinafter cited by ERISA section number]. See also DRUCKER,
supra note 23; JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW (The Found. Press, Inc. 1990) (discussing a variety of employment
law topics, including ERISA). Here the discussion ignores such proposals as that
to diminish or even eliminate capital gains taxation. Such proposals appear to be
aimed at―and doubtless would have the effect of―more rewarding of those who
already own than fostering wider ownership.
53 Congressional action culminating in the passage of ERISA was precipitated
by the folding of the Studebaker corporation, which, bankruptcy proceedings
subsequently discovered, had grossly underfunded, and indeed “raided,” its
employee pension fund, leaving the suddenly unemployed pensioners doubly
bereft. See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 52, at 68–84. Those familiar with recent
bankruptcies, particularly in the airline industry, might be tempted to say plus ça
change.
54 See Hockett, Of ESOPs, supra headnote, at 914–23 (arguing that ESOPs can
be part of the method of distributing the benefits of globalization to all citizens).
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be more with how the aim is affected, and why we seem willing to
affect it in the manner we do. For the mechanics and politics here
would seem to be generalizable in ways that might benefit “Twos”
and, especially, “Threes.” The plan here is to exploit that ability to
be generalized below.
A preliminary terminological point before proceeding: in
speaking of ESOPs (“Plans”), one can be speaking of any of several
distinct but related species of financial arrangement.55 All, as befits
their shared name and as intimated above, aim to facilitate
laborers’ acquisition of shares in the firms for which they work.56
By far the most common such set of arrangements, however, and
the one that this Article will thus engage, is the so-called
“leveraged” ESOP.57 This, as the qualifier suggests, is the plan that
employs credit in the share-acquiring process.58
3.1 What They Do: Simple Mechanics and Spread
The leveraged ESOP works as follows:59 The employing firm
adopts an ESOP as a sponsored ERISA plan—more specifically, a
defined contribution plan.60 Like other ERISA plans, the ESOP
takes the legal form of a trust.61 It is a distinct, even if firm55 See JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP: REVOLUTION OR RIPOFF?
64–84 (1988) (briefly cataloguing ESOP types).
56 Id.
57 Id. at 68–78.
58 The principal non-credit-employing ESOPs—so-called “non-leveraged
ESOPs,” “tax-credit ESOPs” (“TRASOPs”), and “payroll ESOPs” (“PAYSOPs”)—
are briefly elaborated id. at 64–84.
59 The transactions which follow are related, in slightly differing order and
somewhat less detail, in EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FUNDAMENTALS OF
EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 121–22 (3d ed. 1987).
60 ERISA § 407(d)(6).
Defined contribution, or “DC” plans, are to be
distinguished from so-called “defined benefit” or “DB” plans. The former
prescribe a schedule of payments made into an account for the benefit of the
employee, who in turn bears both “upside” gains and “downside” losses realized
by her investment portfolio over time. DB plans, by contrast, prescribe payments
made out to the employee upon her retirement, and the employing firm—or the
insurance company from whom the firm purchases annuities on behalf of its
employee beneficiaries—in effect bears the aforementioned upside gains and
downside losses realized by the fund out of which payments are made.
61 ERISA § 403(a). The idea, of course, is both to insulate funds earmarked
for employees from the other financial operations of the firm, and to afford the
employee beneficiaries the benefit of fiduciary obligations owed to them by the
plan’s trustee. It is regrettably not clear, however, whether the trust protections
offered employees by pension trusts are as fulsome as those offered to
beneficiaries of other trusts. See, e.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 263
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sponsored and ultimately board-directed, entity formed to acquire
and hold stock on behalf of employees. Its administrator, although
named and directed by the sponsoring firm’s board or a firmchosen committee,62 accordingly bears fiduciary obligations to
those employees.63
To begin with, the trust borrows funds from a bank or other
commercial lender partly in exchange for a promissory note.64 It
uses the funds to purchase stock issued by the
sponsoring/employing firm at fair market value.65 The loan
proceeds accordingly pass through the ESOP to the
sponsoring/employing firm itself—the firm finances it—and the
stock is then held in trust on behalf of the employees. The firm
guarantees repayment of the loan by the ESOP to the lender, and
the stock held in the ESOP is itself pledged as security.
Over time the sponsoring/employing firm makes regular cash
contributions to the ESOP, just as in any other kind of defined
contribution plan. In this case, the contributions are used by the
ESOP to amortize the loan originally used to purchase the
sponsoring/employing firm’s shares.66 As the loan is thus paid
down, stock held by the trust is steadily released from its loansecuring role to individual accounts maintained severally on behalf
of the employee/beneficiaries.67 The proportions in which it is
F. Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding that ERISA defines “fiduciaries,”
“fiduciary functions,” and “fiduciary duties” more narrowly than does common
law trust doctrine). See also infra note 84 for cases regarding the fiduciary duty of
ESOP trustees under ERISA.
62 ERISA § 403(a)(1). A partial exception, which need not here detain us, is
found at ERISA § 403(a)(2).
63 ERISA § 404(a)(1).
64 Only “partly” for reasons that will be made plain over the next several
sentences.
65 Because the shares are purchased at fair market value, the purchase is
sometimes misleadingly described by ESOP-proponents as an equity injection. In
actuality, it is publicly subsidized debt financing, accompanied by a stock
giveaway.
66
So the sponsoring/employing firm is, in effect, both borrowing and
paying back on behalf of employees for the purchase of its own stock—it gives out
partial ownership of itself as an employee benefit. This dilutes the stake of
previous owners—more on this presently.
67 Typically the shares become transferable or redeemable only upon
retirement or exit of the firm, and typically the firm buys them back. There are
voting restrictions (even to the vanishing point) as well, as will be shown
presently. That is all significant when it comes to the question of just what
“owning” should mean here, but it is not the subject of this Article. For more on
that question, see Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote.
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released to those accounts track the beneficiaries’ labor-patronage
of the sponsoring firm (their wages or salaries). Diagrammatically,
things look like this:
FIGURE 1: FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A LEVERAGED ESOP
ARRANGEMENT

Employer/
Firm

Newly Issued
Common Stock

Guaranty of
Trust Note
Dividends
$ Proceeds
$ Loan

ESOP
Trust

Lending
Institution
Promissory Note,
Stock as Collateral

Stock as Debt
is Paid Down

Timely Repayment

Employee
ESOP
Accounts

Not surprisingly, in view of the arrangement’s financial
structure,68 this all proves to work rather well as a method of
getting more “capital into the hands of labor” (not to mention more
debt financing to the firm, as will be shown presently). Some
statistics are telling: By 1986, twelve years after ESOPs had gained
congressional endorsement in ERISA, nearly five thousand firms

68 With one possible—though minimal—caveat to be noted below, the
employee/beneficiaries neither pay nor pledge anything. The firm, in effect, does
it all (or nearly all, as the government’s role will show).
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had adopted leveraged ESOP plans.69 About twenty-five percent
of those plans held more than twenty-five percent of the
outstanding stock of their firms, and nearly two percent of them
owned all such stock.70 By 1990, over twelve million laborers—
about ten percent of the workforce—in over ten thousand firms
had come to participate in ESOPs.71
By the late 1990s, ESOPs were estimated to account for almost
four percent of corporate equity-holding in the United States.72
Moreover, the rate of ESOP growth, by this point had come to
average between three hundred and six hundred new plans per
year, accounting for between three hundred thousand and six
hundred thousand new employee participants per year.73 Some of
the sponsoring firms over the past thirty years have been such
familiar American stalwarts as Avis, Chicago Tribune, Delta,
Federal Express, General Motors, Kraft, Maytag, Polaroid, Procter
& Gamble, Quaker Oats, United Airlines, and Xerox.74 Even

HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 105.
Id.
71 See, e.g., id. at 105 (describing the proliferation of ESOPs since the 1970s);
Corey Rosen, Employee Ownership: Performance, Prospects, and Promise, in
UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 10–11, 20 (Corey Rosen & Karen M. Young
eds., 1991) (listing firms that participate in ESOPs); Gianna Durson, The Structure
and Implementation of ESOPs in Public Companies, in THE EXPANDING ROLE OF ESOPS
IN PUBLIC COMPANIES 11, 23–27 (Karen M. Young ed., 1990) (listing additional
firms that participate in ESOPs); DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKEROWNED FIRM 110 (1990) (noting the large numbers of ESOPs in the United States).
ESOP-like structures have made significant headway in non-US jurisdictions as
well. See Rosen, supra note 71, at 18–19 (discussing interest in, or attempts to
implement, ESOPs in firms in other countries). A helpful catalogue of the
thousand largest firms with more than four percent employee ownership is found
in JOSEPH RAPHAEL BLASI & DOUGLAS LYNN KRUSE, THE NEW OWNERS 257–301
(1991). The catalogue does not disaggregate employee ownership by ESOP,
profit-sharing, 401(k), and option plans, but is nonetheless suggestive in light both
of (a) ESOPs’ accounting for slightly less than half of employee-owned equity, and
(b) the surprising number of firms on the list that are twenty or more percent
employee-owned.
72 See NATIONAL CENTER FOR EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP, STATISTICAL PROFILE OF
EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP (1997) (estimating that nine percent of equity is employeeowned, with profit-sharing, 401(k), and stock option plans accounting for the nonESOP balance). It should be noted that about four percent of ESOPs are estimated
to be terminated each year. Id.
73 Id.
74 Rosen, supra note 71, at 10–11, 20; Durson, supra note 71, at 23–27.
69
70
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skeptics of ESOPs, and of the often eccentric financial
pronouncements of the ESOP’s inventor, Louis Kelso,75 readily
acknowledge their “rapid proliferation,”76 hence concluding that
“[s]omething is happening that requires attention.”77 But what is it
that has been “happening,” and why might it require attention?
What do the telling statistics actually tell?
ESOP promoters historically have tended to speak of ESOPs’
successes as though all were a “natural” function of superior
financial engineering, the “self-liquidation” of “capital mortgages,”
and the incentive effects that growing ownership imparts to
laborers.
Louis Kelso stated that “the corporation and its
employees can achieve [through ESOP-financing] several hundred
percent greater efficiency in the use of corporate earnings for
capital purposes than through conventional . . . financing.”78
Similarly, Kelsonian acolyte Stuart Speiser asserted that “th[e] new
capital . . . pay[s] for itself out of the increased profits flowing from
expanded production.”79 And the reliably perky business journal,
Inc., wrote “there’s considerable evidence that eliminating the
employee mentality and creating companies of businesspeople, of
owners, has become a kind of Hidden Secret of Success in the
American marketplace.”80

75 Kelso routinely announced such putative discoveries as “Say’s Law” is
being “violated” in modern capitalist economies, that contemporary economists
remain wedded to the labor theory of value, and that there are “two factors” that
enter into production—capital and labor—with the first of those accounting for an
ever-growing share of value-added. See generally Hockett, Hamiltonian Means,
supra headnote, at 124–42 (providing background on Kelso’s ideas and writings).
Economists do not appear to have found these discoveries compelling. It should
be noted, however, that Kelso’s motives, energy, and inventiveness, as
distinguished from his sallies into theory, were nothing if not worthy of praise.
And he was a lawyer and investment banker, not an academic theorist, typically
pitching his advocacy to legislators and the general public rather than fellow
theorists. See generally Speiser, infra note 79.
76 HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 105.
77 ELLERMAN, supra note 71, at 120 (emphasis omitted).
78 LOUIS O. KELSO & PATRICIA HETTER KELSO, DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC
POWER 62 (1986).
79 STUART SPEISER, A PIECE OF THE ACTION 429 (1985) (emphasis added). See
supra note 76 for more on this “pays for itself” locution.
80 John
Case, A Company of Business People, INC., (Apr. 1993),
http://www.inc.com/magazine/19930401/3492.html (discussing the growing
interest in getting employees more involved in managing the business they work
for).
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But in fact the mentioned evidence is hardly “considerable”—
at best it is thin and ambiguous.81 Nor does presently leveragebought ESOP capital “pay for itself” in much more than a trivial
sense; it is far from clear that the dividend streams and/or capital
gains that attend ESOP stock would dependably pay off the term
loans without help of the kind to be described presently. And the
“several hundred percent greater efficiency,” (a quantity which,
like wearyingly many Kelsonian magnitudes, is arrived at by
unspecified means) is hardly “natural,” “economic,” or “financial”
in any pre-legal or pre-political senses of those terms. For the real
“Hidden Secret of [ESOPs’] Success,” it turns out, is no more
obscure than the tax code, ERISA, and combined corporate
governance and takeover law: The leveraged ESOP as currently
constituted is essentially a public benefit conferred, like many such
benefits in the United States, through private channels.
3.2. How They Do It: Private Channels, Public Benefits
The most significant means through which private channels are
brought into the public benefit are tax and ERISA advantages.
These two factors, working in tandem, account both for the
aforementioned “greater efficiency” of ESOPs as financing tools
and for ESOP stock’s seeming capacity to “pay for itself.” They
also afford incentives to the lenders themselves, as well as to nonESOP shareholders from whom an ESOP might seek shares. This
Article will examine each in turn.
3.2.1.

Tax Advantages

Probably the most efficacious tax advantage that leveraged
ESOPs uniquely confer upon sponsoring/employing/issuing firms
is that the Internal Revenue Code allows firms to deduct
contributions made to their plans. The firm may deduct those
contributions, to an amount up to twenty-five percent of all
compensation paid to a plan’s participants, from its taxable
income.82 That advantage works jointly with ERISA’s relaxation, in

81 See BLASI, supra note 55, at 25–27, 221–38 for plenary—and not
unsympathetic—discussion of what evidence there is.
82 I.R.C. § 404(a)(3)(A)(i)(I). ESOPs enjoy other tax advantages enjoyed by
employee pensions more generally, most of which are noted below, but this
Article’s focus will nevertheless be primarily upon what is unique to ESOPs.
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the case of ESOPs, of the now-customary mandatorydiversification understanding of the so-called “prudent investor”
standard to which employee pension trusts ordinarily are subject.
In non-ESOP cases, ERISA requires that employee trusts be
broadly invested; a plan will not typically be permitted to hold
much of the sponsoring firm’s equity.83 ESOPs, however, are
exempted from this standard,84 meaning that the firm which
sponsors a leveraged ESOP can eat the cake and keep the penny. It
enjoys the tax favor bestowed upon contributions to its ERISA
plans by further financing itself through new share issuance.
The aforementioned “further financing”—the “purchase” of
newly issued shares by the legally distinct trust for the
employees—as noted, is leveraged. This simply means that the
firm is effectively financing itself with debt while enjoying a
publicly afforded tax break in return for affording employees new
stock. As it happens, the lender supplying the leverage for ESOPs
receives tax benefits too. Ordinarily, the lender’s taxable income is
the interest received on lent funds,85 but on a loan to a leveraged
ESOP, fifty percent of that interest historically has been excluded.86
Thus in effect, the legislated favors conferred upon ESOPs amount
to significantly government-subsidized debt-financing of ESOPsponsoring firms, in a manner intended to encourage those firms to
make partial firm owners of firm employees.
ERISA § 404(a)(1)(C).
ERISA § 404(a)(2). At least that is ordinarily the case. Courts have in some
instances agreed with the Department of Labor that there can be circumstances in
which the prudent investor standard would require the ESOP trustee to refrain
from purchasing employer stock. See, e.g., Herman v. NationsBank Trust Co., 126
F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1997) (finding that ESOP trustee had duty to act prudently
with shares, even if that action went against a provision of the ESOP); Moench v.
Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that, because ERISA and ESOPs
sometimes have competing goals, the actions of fiduciaries of ESOPs regarding
shares will be subject to an abuse of discretion standard); Kuper v. Iovenko, 66
F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that courts will presume that ESOP fiduciaries’
decisions to remain invested in employer stock is reasonable, although it may be
challenged). It should also be pointed out that any other assets in which the ESOP
might invest remain subject to the general diversification requirement, ERISA §
404(a)(1).
85 I.R.C. § 61(a)(4) (including “interest” in the general definition of gross
income).
86 I.R.C. § 133(a). But see Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-188, §§ 1602(a), 1602(c), I.R.C. § 164 (repealing the interest exclusion
previously allowed under I.R.C. § 133(a) for all securities acquisition loans made
after August 20, 1996, except for loans made pursuant to a binding written
contract which was in effect before June 10, 1996).
83
84
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There is more: ordinarily, dividends paid out to the holders of
firms’ shares are drawn from firms’ after-tax incomes.87 Dividends
paid on the stock held in an ESOP, however, are deductible from
taxable corporate income.88 Capital gains reaped by the trust also
go untaxed; they are deferred compensation.89 The tax code also
affords incentives to non-ESOP shareholders to transfer their
shares to the ESOP. First, under specified conditions a shareholder
in the sponsoring firm who sells shares to the ESOP may defer any
taxable gain that she gleans through the sale.90 Second, fifty
percent of the proceeds from sale of a sponsoring firm’s stock to its
ESOP are excludable from estate taxation.91 Finally, a decedent’s
estate may avoid tax-induced liquidity problems by shedding a
portion of its estate tax liability to an ESOP, provided that it
convey to that ESOP shares in the sponsoring firm of equal value
in exchange.92
3.2.2.

Additional ERISA Advantages

In addition to the just noted tax advantages, there are further
ERISA advantages designed to encourage ESOP share-acquisitions
from non-ESOP shareholders in the sponsoring firm. Pension
plans ordinarily are barred from purchasing sponsoring firms’
shares not only from the sponsoring firms themselves, but also
from all so-called “parties in interest”—directors, officers, and
principal shareholders.93 ERISA, however, exempts ESOPs from
that standard.94 ESOPs also may borrow from such parties in

87 This is true based on the revenue code’s definition of corporate taxable
“income.” See I.R.C. § 311(a) (providing that a corporation may not deduct
dividends from its gross income).
88 I.R.C. § 404(k).
89 I.R.C. § 501(a), (c), (d).
This advantage is not unique to ESOPs as
distinguished from other ERISA plans.
90 I.R.C. § 1042(b)(1)–(2). Among the conditions are provisions stipulating
that proceeds of the sale must be reinvested within one year in a domestic
corporation, and that after the sale the ESOP will own at least thirty percent of the
sponsoring firm’s shares.
91 I.R.C. § 2057 (repealed 1989).
92 I.R.C. § 2210 (repealed 1989).
93 I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A).
94 26 U.S.C. § 408(e).
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interest in order to acquire employing firms’ stock.95
3.2.3.

Publicly Conferred Governance Advantages

There is more to the public benefit story than just tax and
ERISA inducements. A cluster of governance advantages offered by
ESOPs, in this case working through (publicly afforded) corporate
and securities law, offer incumbent managers and otherwise
satisfied shareholders96 an added array of incentives. The firm’s
immediate issuance of new shares to a nominally independent
“third party” ESOP dilutes more than the monetary value of older
shares; it dilutes older shares’ voting power as well.97 This
decrease in voting power makes it more difficult for unsolicited
would-be acquirers to assemble a controlling bloc of shares. Most
importantly, the Delaware Chancery has held that this issuance
legally can in fact be immediate, indeed even in express
contemplation of an impending takeover bid.98
If new employee/owners reliable voting allies of would-be
firm-acquirers, the ESOP’s promise as a takeover defense would be
attenuated. In actuality, however, new employee/owners do not
ally themselves, interests-wise, with potential hostile acquirers. In
any event, employee preferences scarcely matter because
employee/beneficiaries rarely receive voting rights ab initio.99 That
26 U.S.C. § 408(b)(3), I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3).
Including many newly owning employees, were they able to vote their
shares (discussed infra).
97 I say “nominally” independent here partly owing to several ESOP
governance features to be noted presently, and partly owing to the role of the
sponsoring firm’s board in selecting and directing, indeed even functioning as, the
ESOP trustee, see infra note 104.
98 See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278, 290–91 (Del.
Ch. 1989) (denying an injunction to halt the issuance of stock because the
company’s action was a good-faith, reasonable defense to a takeover). But see
NCR Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 501–03 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
(holding that the plan was unenforceable because the primary purpose of the
ESOP was to thwart a takeover, not to provide for employees’ retirement).
99 A few details are in order here. Most stock held by ESOPs considered in
aggregate is nonvoting stock: the median ESOP holds ten percent of its
sponsoring firm’s shares, but only five percent of that firm’s voting rights. See
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS:
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF ESOP TAX INCENTIVES FOR BROADENING STOCK OWNERSHIP
39–40 (GAO/PEMD-87-8 1986) (“. . . some of the stock held by ESOPs does not
carry voting rights.”). How can this be? Partition the class of ESOPs into those
sponsored by closely held firms and those sponsored by publicly traded firms.
Consider the first of those subclasses. With little exception, closely held
sponsoring firms enjoy all applicable ESOP tax benefits even if their ESOPs do not
95
96
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in itself constitutes, of course, another incentive for ESOP-creation,
an incentive enjoyed by the managers. ESOPs therefore provide
yet another benefit: managers would not have to deal with
dissatisfied shareholders, including employee shareholders. It is
thus more than likely that the ESOP’s utility in warding off
takeovers and enhancing managerial freedom of action might also
account in significant measure for ESOPs’ proliferation. Utility
itself, like the favorable tax and ERISA treatment, amounts to a
public benefit.
It is sanctioned and indeed affirmatively
encouraged by both legislation and court decision.
3.2.4.

Bringing It All Together: A Telling Counterfactual

It surely cannot be objectionable, then, to suggest that the
legislative and judicial favoring of ESOPs—hence ESOPs’
amounting to a public benefit—might be playing a role in their
spread.100 A stylized scenario may a fortiori sharpen, supplement,
and stylize how government favoring spurs the growth of ESOPs.
Assume, arguendo, that the financing of firms via ESOPs is not
favored by the tax code, ERISA, or any other means, and that the
same loan on the same terms can be otherwise obtained. Also
assume that ESOPs offer no governance or takeover-avoidance
advantages, and that employees do not temper their wage
demands by dint of their ESOP benefit; their new shares are “all
gravy.” Lastly, suppose that the laborers’ gradually growing
pass acquired stock voting rights through to employee/beneficiaries. The only
exception is voting on “fundamental” transactions—matters which must,
according to charter or applicable law, be decided by supermajorities of
outstanding shares voted. See I.R.C. §§ 409(e)(3), 401(a)(22) (including matters
such as “approval or disapproval of any corporate merger or consolidation,
recapitalization, reclassification, liquidation, dissolution, sale of substantially all
assets of a trade or business, or such similar transaction as the Secretary may
prescribe in regulations”).
Next, consider the second subclass. While in the case of publicly held firms
voting rights must be passed through to the employee/beneficiaries, it is so only
in respect to stock actually allocated to employee accounts. See generally I.R.C. §
4975(e)(7) (defining ESOPs). Allocation, however, occurs only gradually as the
original loan is amortized. Note also that this lack of control rights ought to give
pause to those who would see in the current “ESOP revolution” any real
harbinger of an incipient “workplace democracy.”
100 I am by no means the first to suggest the importance of public support for
the spread. See, e.g., BLASI, supra note 55, at 64–84 (cataloguing ESOP types and
their benefits); HANSMANN, supra note 19 (noting the rapid expansion of ESOPs
and their benefits for employees); ELLERMAN, supra note 71, at 110 (observing the
significant impact of growing ESOPs).
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“ownership” does not appreciably boost shop floor morale, nor
does it consequently bolster productivity and firm profitability.
Under these circumstances, what would happen in Figure 1,
above? The firm, via the ESOP, would finance its projects by
borrowing and repaying, while issuing new stock to employees
who pay nothing. This would mean, however, that the value of
pre-ESOP shares is diluted by the value of the newly issued ESOP
shares, with no offsetting advantages enjoyed by the pre-ESOP
shareholders. Why would the latter not object?
It is tempting to think there are less proximate political
answers—discussed momentarily—but the most immediate reason
is that several of the foregoing suppositions do not obtain. There
are considerable tax, ERISA, and governance advantages gained
through ESOPs. There is also some evidence that employees do
temper wage demands in view of the ESOP benefit—that there
might even be an implicit bargain to this effect—but this can be no
more than a small part of the story.101
Only the supposition that growing ownership fails to
significantly impact productivity appears valid in light of extant
evidence. Ergo, tax, ERISA, and governance advantages—the
cluster of public benefits—enjoyed by ESOPs must surely be
critical to their spread. Pre-ESOP shareholders, at least the less
other-regarding ones,102 are, notwithstanding their self-concern,
willing to endure the dilution of their shares wrought by leveraged
ESOP transactions. They are willing to do so precisely because the
now much cheaper (due to favorable treatment by tax provisions
and ERISA) debt-financed firm is sufficiently more valuable, in
consequence, as to offset partly or wholly the dilution. To
whatever degree those shareholders are not wholly compensated
in this way, the control benefits imparted by ESOPs to
101 For one thing, the evidence is scant. See ELLERMAN, supra note 71, at 90
(discussing trade-offs in political democracies), BLASI, supra note 55, at 263
(detailing the relationship between retained earnings and funding for ESOPs). As
a theoretical matter it seems highly unlikely that rational employees would be
willing to reduce their wages sufficiently to offset the dilution. The diluting
shares issued to them are, after all, deferred compensation which confers none of
the consumption benefits of control. Additionally, they are undiversified
investments. It would be far more sensible for employees willing to sacrifice pay
for stock to insist upon voting and/or diversified stock. Hence, they would not
offer any sacrifices sufficient to offset the dilution of their own firms’ owners’
stock.
102 See infra Section 3.3. The other-regarding ones might partly be actuated by
ideological/political motivations.
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management make up the difference; any dissatisfied shareholders
are weakened by the court-sanctioned ESOP transactions.
3.3. Why We Like Them: Accounting for the Favor
The (plausible) assumption that law-conferred tax, ERISA, and
governance benefits constitute a, if not the, critical reason for
ESOPs’ proliferation, raises another question: Why is this public
favoring of ESOPs politically accepted and even endorsed in the
United States? Does the support not tamper with “natural” market
forces, and is distortion of this sort not disfavored by many wellto-do Americans?103 It is tempting to think that those who would
seek to render global trade and investment liberalization more
justly to all the world’s inhabitants shall find the successes of
ESOPs instructive.
The mutually reinforcing ethical and
endowment-psychological reasons appear to account for the
United States’ public and private favoring of ESOPs.
3.3.1

Core Values: Responsibility and Equal Opportunity

The key to the ESOP’s political success probably lies in its
giving expression to a cluster of interlinked ethical-cum-political
values and endowment-psychological dispositions that are shared
by a broad swath of Americans and, there is good reason to
believe, persons worldwide.104 Values-wise, most people are
opportunity-egalitarian in their commitments.105 We believe that
what people have should ideally be traceable to equal initial
holdings of such ethically exogenous resources—favors of fortune,
103 Certainly some seem to think so.
See, e.g., Michael W. Melton,
Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363, 363–64 (1990) (arguing that ESOPs do
not efficiently achieve capital formulation, wealth redistribution, and other goals);
Richard L. Doernberg & Jonathan R. Macey, ESOPs and Economic Distortion, 23
HARV. J. LEGIS. 103, 103 (1986) (claiming that ESOPs cause inefficient market
distortion due to overly strict regulations in ESOP legislation).
104 For more on the invariance of these dispositions across cultures and
subcultures, see, for example, Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra
note 10, for a description of common intuitions of distributive justice, and
Hockett, Taking Distribution Seriously, supra note 10, for a description of how the
concept of distribution should be treated in law and economic literature.
105 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra, headnote, at 31–51 (arguing that
most people support a norm of parity and fairness vis-á-vis goverment); Hockett,
Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 57–68 (noting that it may now be possible
to design an equal “ownership society” in agricultural, commercial, and industrial
spheres); see also Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote, at 93 (describing the
Bretton Woods Institutions as supportive of equality of opportunity).
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of chance or mere circumstance, the global “stuff” of Section 1—as
no one now living is responsible for having created. They believe
that people’s success should ideally be traceable to equal initial
holdings of ethically exogenous resources such as favors of
fortune, chance, or mere circumstance, not to be dictated by the
machinations of anyone presently living.106 It is believed that
departures from that baseline ideally would be the product of
value-additive or -detractive effort—of choice rather than chance—
for which people are responsible.107
It is tempting to think of access to value-adding opportunity—
to business capital as well as to dwelling space and basic human
capital—as part of that ethically exogenous endowment to which
all should ideally enjoy access.108 Ethical intuitions such as these
underwrite the first several assumptions, noted in Section 1,
implicit in the thinking of many who find globalization ethically
perplexing.
3.3.2.

Endowment Dispositions: Loss Aversion and “Handout”
Aversion

Endowment-psychological dispositions-wise, people are apt to
experience some methods of redressing imbalances in the
distribution of that aforementioned exogenous endowment as less
discomfiting than others.109 For example, individuals’ more
instinctively self-regarding, less reflectively ethical selves, are
prone to feel friendlier toward distributing apparently “new”
resources to the presently under-endowed than toward “taking”
already held resources from the over-endowed for redistributive
purposes.110 Those same less reflective selves will tend to regard a
perceived “refraining from taking” from the under-endowed as

See sources cited supra note 105.
See sources cited supra note 105.
108 See sources cited supra note 105.
109 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 58–72, 80–87 (observing
that most people support giving to the “have-nots,” though not necessarily at the
expense of “haves”); Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 73–83
(describing support in American political traditions for an “efficient equalopportunity republic”).
110 See sources cited supra note 109. I employ scare-quotes here to register the
fact that the “newness” and “taking” in question are experienced as such prereflectively, as their proceeding from cognitive dispositions would suggest. I am
speaking of predisposed framings here rather than considered judgments.
106
107

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

136

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:1

preferable to a mere “giving” to the same.111 Finally, individuals,
in their more self-regarding moments, will generally be more
amenable to any perceived “giving” to the degree that it can be
plausibly framed as an earned rewarding of—hence as ethically
endogenized, or deserved by—the recipient.112
Such are the “spoons full” of endowment-psychological
“sugar,” that typically “make the medicine” of redressing justicial
imbalance “go down.”113 This is not a matter of “fooling
ourselves” or the citizenry, or of acting with less than an honest
transparency.114 It is simply a matter of making deliberate
accommodation, in the interest of acting justly, with those prereflective perceptual tendencies that most people, on reflection,
recognize to be instinctively active in much of their predeliberative cognition. The apt comparison here would be to
Ulysses, who, in contemplation of the sirens ahead, asked to be
bound to the mast.115
3.3.3.

How the SOP Structure Conforms

The leveraged ESOP coheres nicely with the values and
dispositions just rehearsed. It spreads a basic endowment which is
not difficult to view as being, at least in part or potential, ethically
exogenous.116 The leveraged ESOP spreads that endowment by
distributing what can saliently, if nevertheless superficially, be
viewed as “new” capital—newly issued shares in firms.117 It does
that partly in what resembles a return for reward-earning effort—

111
See sources cited supra note 109. Scare-quotes are used in a similar
manner as those in the text accompanying the previous footnote.
112 See sources cited supra note 109.
113 Apologies, of course, to Mary Poppins and her creators.
114 Thanks to Joel Trachtman and Annelise Riles in particular for pressing me
on this matter of transparency.
115 Apologies this time to Homer; and to Jon Elster. See JON ELSTER, ULYSSES
AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY (1979).
116 It is in part or potential ethically exogenous in two senses; one trivial, the
other less so. First, one must use it responsibly in order to derive “utility” from it;
it is a kind of resource. Second and less trivially, the quantum of this resource
that one has is at least in part—and sometimes indeed in significant part—the
product of fortune or fate rather than effort. One can hold less than another
simply by dint of having been born to the wrong parents. See generally Hockett,
Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 31–51 (describing different political
perceptions about, and opinions on, the U.S. “ownership society”).
117 “Superficially” in light of what was observed supra, Section 3.2.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/2

2008]

GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER SOCIETY

137

labor patronage or work for the firm.118 The leveraged ESOP
encourages such private rewarding (on the part of lenders and
otherwise-diluted shareholders) largely by refraining from
perceived taking (i.e., through tax breaks) rather than overt taking
and giving.
The leveraged ESOP replicates, in piecemeal and only
somewhat more convoluted fashion, the same strategies that the
United States has employed most elegantly in connection with
publicly facilitated home-spreading and education-spreading since
the early- to mid-twentieth century.119 This appears to be no
accident, for there is considerable historical evidence suggesting
that the ESOP was expressly inspired by the federal home finance
programs set in place over the 1930s and 1940s.120 There is also
good evidence that both these and the federal education finance
programs set in place over the 1960s and 1970s appealed to
legislators and the public alike precisely because of their resonance
with the values and dispositions just rehearsed.121
But then this raises a further question: might the idea of the
leveraged ESOP itself be leveraged yet further, in a manner that
links global “Ones,” “Twos,” “Threes,” and “Fours” in a manner
enabling “Twos” and “Threes” to be compensated by “Ones” at no
expense to “Fours”? Might the salience of the employment relation
that appears to ethically underwrite the ESOP’s popularity carry
over to more attenuated, even severed, employment relations?
More ambitiously, might the ESOP be adapted in a manner that
ultimately makes all global residents part-owners of most of the
world economy’s large firms? It would seem that it might, and this
Article now turns to that prospect.
4.

MORE SOPS FOR MORE PERSONS: ADAPTING THE STRUCTURE TO
ADDITIONAL PATRONAGE FORMS

It should be remembered that labor with a firm—the
employment relation—is an ethically salient patronage relation.122
118 That is to say it is viewed as an “employee benefit,” as something
predicated upon lengthy labor-patronage for—a kind of “loyalty to”—the firm.
More on this infra, Sections 4, 5.
119 See Hockett, Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 98–120, 143–53.
120 Id. at 135–37.
121 Id. at 98–120, 143–53.
122 So far as I have been able to determine, the only scholar who has devoted
much discussion to the relations between patronage and firm ownership is
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Labor is an ongoing mode of relation between persons and firms,123
and it is a mode of relation that appears to sanction the conferral of
benefits upon persons.124 It renders the latter apparently earning
or deserving of the benefits bestowed upon labor through
Hansmann. See HANSMANN, supra note 19 (exploring different schemes for
ownership of various firm types). However, my use of the concept of patronage
will be somewhat more elastic than Hansmann’s—as it is perhaps intimated by
my addition of the qualifier “ethically salient.” My understanding of the term will
accordingly be a bit different as well. I do not believe, however, that my
understanding and employment of the term will be incompatible with
Hansmann’s. See supra notes 111–12 for an example of my use of the term.
123 Hansmann appears to be less explicitly concerned with the “ongoingness”
of patronage relations, while being more explicitly concerned with a particular
species of relating to the firm—namely, selling to or purchasing from it—than I.
See supra note 118. I think our distinct concerns with patronage are nonetheless
compatible, however. First, my concern with the possible ethical salience of
patronage naturally lends itself to an emphasis upon longer-term relations, at
least among those who purchase from or contribute to firms in small increments
per transaction. (Duration of relations substitutes for magnitude of individual
transaction.) Second, patronage relations, as potentially involving more than
purchasing and selling alone, are implicit in Hansmann’s own understanding of
the term, because the occasional recourse to the broader relational concept of
“supplying” figures prominently in Hansmann’s treatment of stock-holders as
financial capital suppliers. HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 12–16.
124 Hansmann defines “patrons” as “persons who transact with a firm either
as purchasers of the firm’s products or as sellers to the firm of supplies, labor, or
other factors of production.” HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 12. Much of the thrust
of Hansmann’s often astonishingly insightful monograph is devoted to showing
both (a) that it is typically a particular class of patrons which owns most of the
firms operating within a particular industry, and (b) why it is that the particular
classes which tend to own in particular industries end up being the more efficient
owners. My interest in this Article, though not incompatible with Hansmann’s
interest, is nonetheless distinct. The distinction accounts for my somewhat
broadened understanding and employment of the concept of patronage. My
concern is with patronage as a form of ongoing relation between persons and
firms, such as can be viewed in part as the patron’s consistent conferral of some
manner of benefit upon the firm. This can in turn engage our willingness to view
the patron’s coming to own a share of the firm as ethically unobjectionable—as
something better than the product of a mere handout. That is to say my angle on
patronage here is as a “desert basis” in the sense described supra, note 169. I do
not believe that this basis for interest in patronage places me at odds with
Hansmann’s efficiency-grounded basis for interest in the same; I do not here
suggest that firms should be owned by patrons of a different kind than those that
he shows to be the more efficient owners of firms in particular industries. Rather,
I simply propose that more patrons within the class be added to the rosters of
owners. The remainder of this Section will both make this plain and unpack more
fully the ways in which patronage relations might be seen as ethically
underwriting benefit-conferrals upon current non-owners within patronage
classes.
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leveraged ESOP financing.125 That was one upshot of Section 3.3
above.
Yet labor is but one way in which people continually relate
themselves to firms. This raises an intriguing prospect: perhaps a
new method might rely upon patronage relations in addition to, or
that vary upon, the employment relation in order to warrant the
public facilitation of share-spreading—in particular, to those called
“Peters,” or “Twos” and “Threes” above. This Section proposes
and assesses a few possibilities, meant to be suggestive rather than
exhaustive. This Article will take a brief sequence of suggestive
steps to approach the proposed plan.
4.1. A First, Simple Variant: Customer Stock Ownership Plans
One conspicuous form of patronage, in some respects
reminiscent of labor, is ongoing customer-ship.126 Some firms from
which customers purchase goods and services are the firms from
which these customers regularly purchase them. In some cases that
consistency is attributable to something like customer loyalty—an
investment of trust, rather than labor, in the firm. In other cases
the “loyalty” is perhaps not voluntary, but instead reflects a lack of
available alternatives—the customer is held hostage, so to speak.
And there are of course middling cases between the extremes, such
as unthinking habit or ignorance of alternative supply sources. In
all such cases, however, it is plausible that the relation is
sufficiently salient, from an ethical point of view, as to warrant at
least some degree of public facilitation for patrons to gradually
come to own parts of the firms that they regularly patronize.127
125 Please see the discussion in Section 3.3, supra, which suggests reasons why
ESOPs are publicly favored.
126 Indeed, in some industries customers constitute the most efficient class of
firm owners. Examples are the farm supply industry, in which consumer
cooperatives constitute an oft-encountered firm form; rural electricity, in which
customer cooperatives again figure prominently; clubs that afford their members
high-status “associative goods,” which again tend to be owned by their members;
and urban housing, in which housing cooperatives figure prominently. See
generally HANSMANN, supra note 19, at 149–223 (detailing customer-owned
industries and firm types).
127 Again, sometimes this happens quite “naturally,” for reasons that appear
to be rooted in the comparative efficiencies of governance and contracting. See
source cited supra note 109. But the reasons for interest in an “ownership society”
warrant considering the fostering of ownership even where it does not quite
“naturally” arise, which of course seems to be what has occurred in the case of
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Consider a homespun example: there might be a small
university town, centrally located, hence perhaps geographically
isolated, in a large U.S. state.128 People who live and work in the
town see a lot of each other, and consequently come to feel a
palpable sense of community. They feel this not only in relation to
one to another, but also in relation to the relatively small number
of retail establishments that sell to the townspeople. Buyers and
sellers are thrown all together, feel “centrally isolated” together,
and perhaps miss this feeling when they are away.
Then a remarkable new grocery store complex comes to this
town.129 Everyone talks about the new store, even showing it off to
visitors and prospective new residents. They are as proud as they
are pleased that at long last it has arrived.130 Nearly everyone
living or working within several miles of the town now purchases
groceries at this complex, does dry cleaning there, does their
banking there, and even leaves their children to be attended there
while shopping. Things might develop and go on in this way for
years. It is an ongoing, multi-faceted, relation.
Now suppose the recently floated American idea of an
“ownership society” is found to be an attractive one, for any
number of reasons,131 and thus it is considered good public policy

ESOP proliferation. See supra Section 3 (describing how ESOPs operate). Those
same reasons presumably afford at least a preliminary answer to prospective
objections rooted in the same normative source as familiar objections to
disgorgement remedies in contract, owing to their inefficiently coupling
purchases with investments in firms. See Hockett, sources cited supra headnote.
Thank you to Daniel Markovits for pressing me here.
128 I am thinking of Ithaca, NY, where I live. But there are countless similarly
situated locales, not all of them university towns and not all of them as relatively
isolated as Ithaca. Indeed, this example might also be plausibly applied to a
community-like neighborhood or sector of a large city, such as is commonly
found in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Yet please bear in mind that the
example following this one will make no reference to community-like towns at all.
All examples in this Article are meant to be illustrative and suggestive, even to
spur additional visualizations; they do not purport to be exclusive or exhaustive.
129 I am alluding to Wegman’s in Ithaca NY, a store about which many
indeed speak with pride. This firm is not publicly traded, so I am asking that the
reader pretend that it is.
130 It is one of those towns that has difficulty attracting and keeping
nationally or even regionally known merchant establishments.
131 There are a variety of grounds upon, and the three principal American
political traditions to which, the notion of an “ownership society” might be
attractive. See generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote, at 5–78.
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to encourage wider ownership of firms. In that circumstance,
might it not be politically acceptable, even attractive, to encourage
the voluntary spread of shares in this store (or its holding

company) among the regular customers who live in community
with, and partly organize their lives around, this store—just as it is
in the case of employees? Of course it might.132
Consider a cognate example, applicable perhaps to not only
smaller communities but also larger metropolitan areas or wider
regions. There might be a product or service with increasing
returns to scale. It is a “natural monopoly.”133 Perhaps it is a
transport system, an electrical power grid or a high-speed internet
network—a public or publicly regulated utility. Customers of the
firms that supply such products and services, whether identified
by reference to towns, cities or larger regions serviced by these
firms, might often find themselves more or less “stuck” with their
suppliers. They have little choice but to patronize them. That is a
large part of why they are regulated. But might the same rationale
thus warrant facilitating the customers to gradually come to own
these suppliers, at least in part? Surely customer hostage is at least
as ethically salient a patronage-form as is more voluntary customer
loyalty.
Were this line of thinking to be continued, it might be
worthwhile to consider facilitating patrons’ acquisition of shares in
the firms—the grocery store or the utility—in much the same way
132 Of course it is not the case that facilitating ownership of local businesses
will afford optimal diversification. After all, personal incomes and the incomes of
town-sharing or region-sharing firms can to some extent co-vary—for example, in
the case of local or regional slumps. But I ask that the reader bear with me a bit
longer. The examples below show that diversification grows. Moreover, the aim
here is to make use of patronage relations as ethically salient grounds for public
action facilitating ownership, pursuant both (a) to the hypothesis posited supra
Section 3.3, concerning why the public is willing to subsidize ESOP expansion,
and (b) to expand the hypotheses of this Article’s predecessor pieces, concerning
why we have acted similarly to promote home-owning and the spread of higher
education. Please note, for a discussion of the project of democratizing incomerisk-sharing across localities and even across nations in a separate article, Hockett,
Global Macro-Hedging, supra headnote at 212–56. These pieces read together aim to
provide at least a rough template for how best to render society more “owning,”
more risk-spread-efficient, and more just.
133 In a way, so was the store in the previous example. Small towns support
less competition among smallish suppliers than do cities.
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that share-acquisition in firms by employees is facilitated. Tax
breaks could be granted to firms that issue shares to trusts whose
beneficiaries gradually came to own legally what initially they
would beneficially own. (Again, perhaps, as in the labor case, this
would be in proportion to their patronage—e.g., amounts
purchased from the firms in place of wages earned working for
firms.) In essence, then, the financial structure of the leveraged
ESOP arrangement would be replicated. Only the particular
patronage relation would change. It could be called a “Customer
Stock Ownership Plan,” or “CuSOP.”134 Imagine it thus:
FIGURE 2: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A CUSOP
ARRANGEMENT

Provider/
Firm

Newly Issued
Common Stock

Guaranty of
Trust Note
Dividends
$ Proceeds
$ Loan

CuSOP
Trust

Lending
Institution
Promissory Note,
Stock as Collateral

Stock as Debt
is Paid Down

Timely Repayment

Customer
CuSOP
Accounts

134 This SOP is not to be confused with the “consumer stock ownership plan”
proposed by Kelso, which latter appears to be little more than a producer co-op.
KELSO & KELSO, supra note 78, at 67–73.
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Of course, it would be different here relative to the ESOP as
presently constituted, even apart from the differing patronage
relation that ethically grounds it. For example, there is no federal
“CRISA” for “customer benefit plans” in the way that there is an
ERISA structure upon which ESOP programs partly are built. Nor,
accordingly, does the revenue code currently include any
provisions that might encourage firm-financing through CuSOPs
as it does in the case of ESOPs. But that is all beside the point. The
point is that all of the means by which stock-acquisition is
currently facilitated by employees could be legislatively replicated
to facilitate stock-acquisition by long-term customers—loyal
customers, hostage customers, or “in-between” customers. And
the public benefit that such legislation would effectively confer—
similar to that which public facilitation of ESOPs confers—would
be warranted, could be advocated, and presumably would be
politically embraced, on much the same grounds of ethically
salient patronage.
4.2. A Second, Closer Variant: Rent-Recouping Stock Ownership
Plans
One more example draws yet closer to the plan proposed
below for those “Twos” and “Threes” disproportionately harmed
by global trade and investment liberalization: sometimes new
resources are discovered. Petroleum reserves are found in Alaska,
newly exploitable minerals are found in beds of magnesium
nodules just off the California coast, tar sands are found north of
Canada, or some portion of the electromagnetic spectrum becomes
usable in a way that it was not before. Sometimes no living person
or group of persons can be credited with the discovery, or with the
discovery’s full exploitability. But some person or persons often
can be partly credited. In such cases, the “Western,” especially
“American,” way of doing things is to permit private agents,
generally firms, to exploit the new possibilities by essentially
appropriating rents from them.135 Some of the value of the new
resources, from rents, should flow very quickly into private hands,
even while not all of that value seems to be deserved by those
135 The justification of appropriable rents for property rights appears to
originate, at least in its canonical formulation, with Harold Demsetz. See Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 347 (1967)
(arguing that property rights are essential for markets to perform efficiently).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

144

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:1

parties.
What to do with the surplus? The “windfall profits” could be
taxed, but that might resemble a kind of incremental taking,136 and
the takings go to the government. Westerners, and especially
Americans, do not seem to like that kind of taxation anymore.137
At any rate, they do not find it as palatable as they once did,
perhaps because they are less trusting of the users of the takings—
”the government”—than they once were.138 Yet many people,
Americans in particular, still like ownership—very much, in fact—
and they are aware that, by definition, nobody has earned a
windfall. So why not widen the distribution of shares in the firms
authorized to exploit the new opportunities?
But this still leaves open the question of patronage. To whom
should the shares be distributed? Is there some saliently or
perceivably “natural” class of patrons whose beneficiary status
would be as readily warranted as that of employees and long-term
customers? After all, it would not be desirable to simply replace
one class of windfall beneficiaries with another, as if it were at
random. How, then, to think about this? It is tempting to suggest
a sort of “sliding scale” here. And indeed this might be a nice way
to gradually generalize the original ESOP idea to move
incrementally in the direction of a broad global recognition that
good citizenship and faultless wage or salary loss themselves
constitute an ethically salient kind of patronage.139
For example, some new resources might be broadly perceived
as bearing some special nexus to the places where they are found.

136 This claim, associated with Richard Epstein, is of course hyperbolic. But
one can readily grasp the intuition that underwrites it. For the hyperbole, see, for
example, RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (arguing that many kinds of governmental takings, such
as progressive and special taxes, may be unconstitutional under a broader
interpretation of the Takings Clause).
137 See, for example, id., for a representative screed. See also MICHAEL J.
GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING
INHERITED WEALTH (2005), for a morbidly fascinating, documentary account of the
exploitation of citizen cognitive error by champions of the tax-evading well-to-do.
138 I employ scare-quotes here because I am simply conveying, rather than
participating in, that attitude pursuant to which some view the government as an
alien force rather than an agent of collective action. Perhaps the current iteration
of this line of hostile thinking all began with the disillusionments of the 1960s,
which seem to have fed directly into the populist “tax revolts” of the 1970s, out of
which so much of current rightward-leaning ideology seems to have grown.
139 This suggestion is taken up infra Section 6.
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Such places, in turn, might be perceived as being somehow
ethically “closer” or legally “more proximate” to—as it were “more
owned
by”—their
residents
than
by
nonresidents.140
Consequently, new oil found in Alaska might be perceived as
being somehow more Alaskan than even American. And Alaskan
citizens might accordingly be thought to stand in a somewhat—
even if incrementally—closer patronage relation to any firmgranted rights to exploit new Alaskan oil reserves than are nonAlaskan Americans.141 After all, Alaska itself is constitutionally
permitted to tax firms that extract Alaskan oil reserves, even after
the (federal) IRS has done so. So it must be the case that citizens of
political units are somehow viewed as more privileged than
noncitizens with respect to benefits brought by the resources that
are found and exploited within the geographic boundaries of those

140 Scare-quotes again indicate that I am attempting to express a pre-reflective
manner of perception. I should note here that I am exceedingly uncomfortable
with this particular perception, and find it to be a compromise with territorialist
psychological dispositions that are regrettable at best. But bear with me for a
moment. Such primitive intuition like this underwrites the judgment that, for
example, coal found between Canada and Mexico is “American” coal, rather than
North American coal or “the coal of mankind.” While, ideally I would prefer to
repudiate the intuition, if we are stuck with it then we may as well harness it to
good purpose.
141 In 1978 and 1980, voters’ initiatives were introduced to establish the
Alaska General Stock Ownership Corporation (AGSOC), which would have
provided Alaskan citizens with ownership interests in the Alaska Oil Pipeline.
Pursuant to a tentative agreement with the British Petroleum Company, the latter
was to sell its interest in the Alaska Pipeline to AGSOC. AGSOC would have
enjoyed the backing of state credit to borrow. Under federal matching
legislation—specifically, Subchapter U of Chapter 1 under Subtitle A of the
Internal Revenue Code—AGSOC would also have enjoyed favorable federal
income tax treatment. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, 92 Stat. 2763,
2892 (1978) (noting the potential creation of a stock ownership corporation). The
AGSOC plan also would have prohibited any one individual from taking
ownership of more than ten shares, in order to prevent concentrated ownership.
See William Greider, Alaska Inc: An Economic Experiment, THE WASH. POST, Oct. 22,
1978, at A1 (describing the planned distribution of wealth from the energy
development to Alaskan citizens). The Alaskan ballot measure nevertheless lost
on a close popular vote (approximately 78,000 to 72,000). See, for example, the
Alaskan state government’s website, Initiatives that Have Been on Alaska’s
Ballots, http://www.elections.alaska.gov/initbal.php (last visited Oct 25, 2008)
which lists Alaskan ballot initiatives since 1960; see also Elliot Jacobson, Senator
Gravel Assumes Leadership of “People’s Lobby”!, 1 NATIONAL INITIATIVE FOR
DEMOCRACY (2002), http://www.ni4d.us/en/nin_1_5/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2008)
(discussing, in part, Senator Gravel’s involvement in the AGSOC proposal).
Notwithstanding the failure of the ballot initiative, Alaska did adopt a cognate
program. See infra note 144.
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units. Cognate observations to these “Alaskan” observations
might hold true with respect to magnesium nodules found off the
coast of Washington, Oregon, and California; tar sands found
north of Canada; and other resources found within the territorial
jurisdictions of other political units. Indeed, international law
treats things much in this way on a nation-by-nation basis.142
Now bring these patronage considerations together with the
earlier rehearsed “windfall” considerations. Would it be too far a
stretch to require, as a condition for granting the firm the rights to
exploit the new resource, that the firm distribute shares in itself to
the residents of any municipality or nation-state with which the
new resource is widely perceived to be especially closely
associated? (For example, residents of any municipality or state
that currently might tax the enterprise that exploits the resources?)
Note that if the answer is “no, it would not be a stretch,” then tax
or other incentives might not be needed at all. Or how about this:
tax and other incentives are combined with the “carrot” that is the
prospective new resource exploitation itself, in a manner that
lessens the former relative to what they were in the ESOP and
CuSOP cases. This encourages both (a) the entry of firms to do the
exploiting, and (b) those firms’ spreading their shares—while
being less expensively (to the public fisc). Call it a “RentSOP.”143 It
might look like this:

See generally Hockett, Limits, supra headnote.
This is not to be confused with Kelso’s proposed “RECOPs,” “GSOPs,” or
“COMCOPs,” which, though apparently geared toward spreading ownership of
some firms cognate with those under consideration here, are both (a) argued for
on entirely different—indeed, puzzling—grounds, and more importantly (b)
presumably for that reason, financially structured differently. See KELSO & KELSO,
supra note 78, at 75–83, 88–92, 99–103. For a more general charitable interpretation
and correction of Kelsonian “theories” and schemes, see Hockett, Jeffersonian
Republic, supra headnote at 124-42.
142
143
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FIGURE 3: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A RENTSOP
ARRANGEMENT
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This is the same diagram as Figures 1 and 2, with state or local
citizens standing in as patrons instead of employees or customers.
(So now the degree of patronage might track years of residence.)144
144 The matter of crafting terms is ignored for present purposes so as to avoid
conflict with court decisions overturning state laws burdening interstate travel,
decided under the Commerce Clause of Article I, the Privileges and Immunities or
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, or some “penumbral
emanation” from those or other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. In Zobel v.
Williams, the Supreme Court rejected Alaskan legislation that awarded pipeline
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What is different, apart from the changed patronage ethically
grounding the public benefit, is simply that the tax and other
benefits afforded by the public are less than before, since the
exploitation rights are themselves a benefit (that is entailed by the
“windfall” considerations). Of course, the loan made to the
RentSOP trust might have to be participated as well, since possibly
in this case, unlike the ESOP and CuSOP cases, it would be too
large for any one lender to make.145 But all of that is neither here
nor there for present purposes. The important point is that the
firm still debt-finances itself on favorable terms in the interest of
boosting its capacity to exploit the new resources, while also
spreading ownership in itself—hence the benefits that accrue to its
owners by dint of its access to the resources.
Note, by connecting the hope of maximizing both the number
of possible beneficiaries and the number of firms that those
beneficiaries might gradually partly own, the understanding of
“local resource” can be readily broadened. That is to say, matters
in this scenario are similarly situated as they were in connection
with CuSOPs in Section 4.1 above, where candidates for RentSOPs
can be proliferated.
The understanding of “local resource” might be broadened
along at least two dimensions. First, it is possible to move outward
from locality to region to nation or economic class, discussed
dividends to state residents based on the duration of their residence up to the
point at which distributions began. 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982). But allowing the
number of shares distributed thenceforth to grow with years of residence would
not seem to be constitutionally offensive so long as one could begin to accumulate
shares immediately upon taking up residence. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 618 (1969) (establishing a fundamental “right to travel”); Edwards v.

California, 314 U.S. 160, 160 (1941) (declaring unconstitutional a law that
prohibited residents from bringing non-resident “indigent persons” into the
state).
145 This is not just as a matter of capacity, but as a matter of law, as well. In
the United States, for example, the Banking Code’s lending limits could kick-in.
See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a)(1) (2006) (limiting the amount that banks may loan at a given
point or to a given individual). According to the code, the total outstanding nonfully-secured loans and credit extended by a national banking association to an
individual, including a trust, must not exceed fifteen percent of that banking
association’s unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (a)(2)
additionally requires that total outstanding fully-secured loans and credit
extensions made by a national banking association not exceed ten percent of the
association’s unimpaired capital and unimpaired surplus.
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above. Second, the understanding of “resource” itself can be
broadened. As discussed in Section 2, it is not always a matter of
found objects or substances, after all. A highly desired set of
geographic coordinates, for example, might count as well—say, a
“prime location” upon which some highly remunerative piece of
commercial real estate stands. That is a paradigmatic case, in fact,
of “rent.” And rentiers who hold exclusionary rights to highly
desired spaces are rather like the “natural monopolists” considered
in connection with CuSOPs above at Section 4.1. This is why the
so-called “classical” economists, pioneers like Adam Smith, David
Ricardo, and Henry George, were so suspicious of them.146 But we
need not be suspicious. Instead, the spaces’ voluntary sale and
purchase at fair market value can be facilitated by broad classes of
locals simply by treating the spaces like oil reserves or magnesium
nodules, and the firms that operate them like resource-extractors,
in Figure 3 just above.147 “Don’t get mad,” we might say, “get
owning. Get the company.”148
146 See, e.g. 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 161–63 (R.H. Campbell, et al., ed., 1976) (describing rent as a
monopoly price that remains independant of expenses laid out by the rentier);
DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 33–45 (Dent
& Sons 1969) (arguing that rentiers are windfall beneficiaries of scarcity).
147 HANSMANN, supra note 19 at 173–79 (suggesting a number of reasons for
the absence of urban utility co-ops analogous to rural electrical co-ops, among
them the comparative transience of urban dwellers relative to rural dwellers and
conflicts of interest among disparate classes of prospective urban owners). While
such phenomena presumably account in part for the absence of spontaneously
generated (sorry—pun foreseen but not intended) urban utility cooperatives, they
do not, so far as I can see, stand in the way of publicly facilitated partial
ownership of corporate utilities by their customers. Moreover, to whatever degree
we might worry that partial ownership by customers is “not enough,” we can
readily mitigate the worry by means familiar to other, existing utilities-ownership
scenarios. Hence, rates can be regulated with a view to preventing pricediscrimination as among classes of users. Similarly, any worry over the
development of, for example, “absentee ownership” in the long run would seem
to be mitigated by: (a) the fact that highly transient residents of a municipality
likely will not come to acquire much in the way of shares; (b) the possibility of
recourse to required redemption—indeed, we might even arrange to have
transients trade their erstwhile utilities’ shares for shares in utilities located in
their new locales, with the utilities themselves in turn exchanging the shares; or at
worst; and (c) the possibility of recourse to mere beneficial ownership by the new
owners, legal ownership to remain with consumer trusts established for the
purpose of retained legal ownership. Indeed, as Hansmann himself points out,
some municipal utilities can readily be likened to cooperatives, since they are
organized quite similarly. Id. at 177.
148 A variation, perhaps, on the 1979 Remington electric razor advertisement,
in which Victor Kiam averred, “I liked it so much, I bought the company.” See I
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Turning from the resource dimension to the locality dimension,
looking at not only “locally located” resources but also more
diffuse such resources—e.g., new portions of the electromagnetic
spectrum—the patronage dimension can be expanded as well.
There will then be more beneficiaries, meaning more potential
owner-beneficiaries of the firm’s privileged access. For example,
imagine that the United States’ Telecommunications Act of 1996149
is amended to work somewhat differently than it actually has:
Congress might not have authorized the FCC simply to grant
existing broadcast companies new “advanced spectrum,” without
requiring payment.150 Instead, it might have established a sort of
“national RentSOP” on behalf of all citizens, and then offered the
combined inducement of occupancy over the HD bandwidths and
some (diminished) tax incentives to get the firms to spread shares
in themselves to the citizenry. That would not only be a readily
intuited extension from the more “locally located” RentSOP idea; it
would also amount to a convenient bridge to a yet more universal
SOP.
5.

A SOP FOR PETER: GLOBAL STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS

Return now to those whose plight occasions the concern of this
article, Section 2’s “Twos” and, especially, “Threes”—those who
were also called “Peters.” Might we not view their heightened
labor income risk as a particularly poignant variation on the
employment relation itself which ethically underwrites the ESOP,
as discussed in Section 3? Might one also view the income gains
Liked the Slogan So Much. . ., http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1357091.stm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2008) (describing the popular influence of powerful slogans).
149 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2000)).
For commentary on the
Telecommunications Act and how it restructured telephone markets, see PETER W.
HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1996); 74 AM. JUR. 2d
Telecommunications § 16 (2001) (describing the Telecommunications Act and how it
restructured telephone markets).
150 See 47 U.S.C. § 336(a) (2000) (“[T]he Commission . . . (1) should limit the
initial eligibility for such licenses [for use of advanced spectrum] to persons
that . . . are licensed to operate a television broadcast station or hold a permit to
construct such a station . . . and (2) shall adopt regulations that allow the holders
of such licenses to offer such ancillary or supplementary services on designated
frequencies as may be consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
necessity.”). For a discussion of the FCC’s grant of a free spectrum for HDTV
under the Act, see Matthew Spitzer, Dean Krattenmaker’s Road Not Taken: The
Political Economy of Broadcasting in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 353, 365–67 (1996).
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realized by “Ones” through globalization as a species of rent as
discussed in Section 4? Certainly.
Consider the following: supposing per hypothesis, that “Peter”
truly is “faultlessly disemployed” in consequence of global trade
and investment liberalization because a more desperate “Paul” can
work for less. Also suppose that “Peter” is aging, and hence is
truly unable to sufficiently “retool” himself to recover all of his lost
income through new forms of employment.
When these
suppositions are borne out, “Peter” bears a particularly poignant,
and indeed ethically salient, relation to his erstwhile employer.151
The employer, and hence the “Marys” who own the employing
firm, have shed him precisely in order to capture the surplus that is
generated by paying less in the form of wages and regulatory
compliance to the more desperate “Pauls.” “Peter’s” labor
patronage in this case has effectively been replaced with a sort of
“shadow,” or “ghost” labor patronage: His erstwhile relation
extinguished, “Peter” is accordingly harmed by no fault of his
own.
Now note that “Mary,” for her part, is no more ethically
creditable than “Peter” is faultable. Mary has simply inherited a
goodly portion of the firm-shares that she owns, or of the wealth
she had expended to purchase them. The capital gains that will
now accrue to those shares in consequence of global trade and
investment liberalization are no more the result of her valueadding effort than were those that accrued to her by dint of her
being born into wealth. They are the consequence of changes in
the global legal environment, with which most “Marys” had
nothing to do. Or perhaps the capital gains are a consequence of
undue influence that “Marys” exercised upon legislators to enact
precisely so they could circumvent hard-won salary and labor
standards.152 From “Marys’” perspective, therefore, they are
windfalls at best, ill-gotten gains at worst. They are rents flowing
her way, by virtue of little more than her exclusive possession of
151 I discuss such “retooling” costs, along with other determinants of
“Peter’s” faultlessness, at length in Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra
headnote; Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra headnote; Hockett, What Kinds of
Stock Ownership Plans Should There Be?, supra headnote.
152
I do not think the more sinister characterization is true of the vast
majority of “Marys.” But there seems to be some truth in the characterization
insofar as it has made of some Marys with friends in today’s Washington, D.C., for
example. One need only consider the 1996 Telecommunications Act noted above
at Section 4 to get the idea (describing how lobbying can influence legislation).
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that which was given to her at birth. Ethically, they are at best on
all fours with mineral deposits or petroleum reserves discovered
beneath her inherited real estate holdings, at worst the proceeds of
venal lobbying activity.153
If these considerations are in order, then do not society’s core
values—its opportunity-egalitarian sense of justice as elaborated
above at Sections 2 and 3.3—suggest we view “Mary” as properly
bound to share some of her globalization-wrought, windfall gains
with “Peter”? And would not “Mary,” in turn, as well as everyone
per our endowment dispositions discussed in Section 3.3, view the
most readily palatable means of facilitating that gain-sharing as that
involving the issuance of new shares, by the globalizationbenefiting and “Peter”-disemploying firms, to “Peter”? Of course,
that will dilute the value of “Mary’s” shares in the firm. This is,
however, simply another way of saying that it will amount to
“Mary’s” sharing her globalization-wrought gains with those
“Peters” who have been laid off by her globalization-benefitting
firms. And as noted above at Section 3.3, sharing of this sort is
much less likely to be experienced as “taking” and “redistributing”
than as “taxing and spending.”
How, then, would a SOP configured in conformity with these
observations be structured? In light of the sample SOP-variants
described in Section 4, it is possible to describe potential models.
The next subsections detail two such renditions—the first narrowly
tailored, the second a bit more ambitious.
5.1. Compensating Lost Labor Patronage: Outsource Stock Ownership
Plans
Think of the first, more narrowly tailored rendition simply as a
straightforward variation on the Rent-SOP. Treat new access to
global intermediate product, capital, and labor markets as the
“resource.” Treat those who are “disemployed” by firms accessing
those newly opened markets as the natural constituents—
analogues to the “citizens of Alaska” countenanced above in
Section 4.2. One could also presumably employ the same means
used to ascertain that “Peter” was disemployed owing to trade
liberalization, and thus an appropriate beneficiary, to presently
determine whether employees hard hit by trade liberalization are
153

Telecommunications Act of 1996.
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entitled to “adjustment relief.”154
Let years of employment with such firms serve as degrees of
patronage—an ethical-intuitively attractive suggestion from “two
angles,” in this case. It is not only true that more years laboring for
the laying-off firm render the patronage relation appreciably
“thicker” or “deeper.” This is something akin to the “loyalty”
interpreted as ethically salient patronage in connection with
CuSOPs in Section 4.1. It is also the case that by laboring for more
years for the laying-off firm, “Peter” has less time to “retool” and
find new employment.
One must also consider that “Peter” is not “disemployed” only
to the benefit of compatriot “Marys” owning compatriot firms.
After all, “Peter’s” firm might not simply “outsource” “Peter’”s
labor. It might go out of business due to competition from foreign
firms. Of course, those firms are held largely by foreign “Marys”—
indeed, in many cases even foreign governments.155 Moreover,
since global investment has been liberalized at least as surely as—
indeed, even more surely than—trade,156 even domestic “Mary” for
her part is likely unharmed. If well advised by investment
consultants, she has long since dumped shares in “Peter’s”
employer for shares in other firms altogether—both domestic and,
increasingly, foreign.157
But if this is true, and the goal is to ensure that the “Marys”
share gains quite generally with “Peters,” then the spreading of
new shares in “disemploying” firms to their erstwhile, now laid
off, employees simply will not suffice. How to do that? In order to
diversify the holdings of “Peters” to render their capital incomes
more secure and plug all other leaks, it is necessary to link “Peters”
to “Marys” via more firms than one.
There are a number of options for establishing such links, no
single one of which must be exclusive. One should accordingly
resist the temptation to try to blueprint in detail every such
possible means. Instead, consider simply what seems like a
suggestive and promising multi-step general strategy: begin with
154 See Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107–210
§116, (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (providing aid to
workers adversely affected by increased importation).
155 China, for example, and other governments control domestic enterprises
by maintaining majority stakes there in.
156 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote.
157 Id.
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healthy, continuing domestic firms that “outsource” their labor,
because the patronage link between such firms and “Peters” is
particularly ethically salient and heuristically compelling.
Structure the plan, which will be called an “OutsourceSOP,” like
the RentSOP discussed in Section 4.2:
FIGURE 4: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF AN
OUTSOURCESOP ARRANGEMENT

Firm

Newly Issued
Common Stock

Guaranty of
Trust Note
Dividends
$ Proceeds
$ Loan

Outsourced
LaborSOP
Trust

Lending
Institution
Promissory Note,
Stock as Collateral

Stock as Debt
is Paid Down

Timely Repayment

Outsourced
LaborSOP
Accounts

The structure here is basically the same as that of Figures 1, 2
and 3 above, with “disemployed” laborers rather than ongoing
employees, customers or “Alaskans” now standing in as our
salient class of patrons. The degree of patronage, however, will
again track years of employment just as in the ESOP. This is
intuitively attractive both because the outsourced employee has
invested more of his working life and “specific human capital” into
the firm and, on the other hand, because the employee now has
less to give to other prospective employers. Other than this and

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss1/2

2008]

GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER SOCIETY

155

the changed patronage basis ethically grounding the public benefit,
the only new wrinkle is simply that the benefits afforded to
outsourcing firms by the public—in the form, inter alia, of
negotiated trade and investment liberalization agreements—are
conditioned upon share-spreading by the firms to their laid-off
laborers. The important point for present purposes is that, just as
in the other SOP examples, the firm here finds itself debt-financing
on favorable terms in the interest of boosting its capacity to exploit
the newly exploitable resource. For example, the firm has an
interest in exploiting a newly opened set of global markets, and
spreading ownership in itself—hence the benefits that accrue to its
owners by dint of its access to those markets—in the process.
But what of the foreign firms? Will they not be more difficult
to rope-in to the scheme than domestic firms? Here things become
a little more complicated, but not insurmountably so, once we
think about it. Indeed the principal “complication” is simply that
there are multiple means of doing justice to “Peter.” One means
would be simply to tax “Marys” with large holdings in foreign
firms, and use the proceeds to purchase shares in the same foreign
firms, which would in turn be placed into SOP-styled “Peter
accounts.” A cognate and perhaps more attractive (because nontaxing) means—though this would work more effectively with
respect to primary issuances than to purchases on the secondary
market—would be to condition investment liberalization (the
continued absence of capital controls) upon foreign firms’ issuing a
certain amount of new stock to such “Peter accounts” per
increment of stock acquired by compatriot “Marys.”
Of course, foreign firms might be expected to protest that
investment in themselves by “Marys” would be rendered less
attractive as a consequence of the taxing method, and thus would
be illicitly disadvantaged relative to domestic investment. If one
were to develop a means of ensuring that it was only indeed
“Marys” whom are being taxed—e.g., by taxing capital gains
realized on foreign stock holdings only beyond some threshold—
however, this would simply amount to the unethical demand that
“Marys” be permitted unjustly to benefit at the expense of innocent
“Peters.” Moreover, investments by “Marys” in firms that abide
by labor, environmental, and other standards equivalent to those
observed by domestic firms could be exempted.158
158 Note that this is not the same thing as conditioning trade liberalization
upon trading partners’ subjecting their firms to the same labor, environmental,
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That of course raises the other, cognate prospect just
mentioned, amounting to yet another means by which to improve
the relative justice-standings of “Mary” and “Peter.” Trade and
investment liberalization could be conditioned upon all benefiting
firms’ financing themselves at least in part through the SOP
structure to enable all “Peters” to share in the gains realized by
“Marys.” That is to say, why not “go national” or indeed “global”
with the full “OutsourceSOP” program itself?
5.2. Going Transnational: “Global Citizen” Stock Ownership Plans
Pursue that last line of thought for a moment and connect it
with the aforementioned matter of the “Marys” who disinvest from
globalization-damaged, “Peter-disemploying” firms in order to
reinvest not abroad, but in other domestic firms to whose
production processes “Peter’s” long-developed firm- or sectorspecific human capital is not suited. Link it up also to the yet
larger matter of income security and its relation to investment
diversification more generally. Might it be possible to develop
either a national or, more ambitiously, multinational compact
pursuant to which all “Peters” nationwide or indeed worldwide
benefit through something like the SOP structure in return for their
“playing by the rules,” or perhaps affording some other form of
national or international service? This might ring a bit grandiose at
present, but please bear with the idea at least for a moment.
It seems plausible to suggest that citizenship itself is a kind of
patronage, even if it is “thinner” than most other forms. It is an
ongoing relation that can warrant, in some cases, the public
conferral of at least some kinds of benefit. At any rate “good
citizenship” would seem so, such that everyone who “plays by the
rules,” “works hard,” or perhaps provides some kind of ongoing
public service can be said to deserve some solicitude, perhaps even
the guarantee of some “basic minimum” from society at large.
Most people, surely feel that they owe a “hand up” to those
who share our core values, obey our laws, seek useful
and other regulatory standards as those to which domestic firms are subjected. It
is only to require that “Marys” who exploit such differentials share the gains that
they realize with the “Peters.” Lest you worry that the effect will nevertheless be
the same, differing only in degree rather than kind by dint of the “Marys” then
turning to invest more in domestic firms that also do not employ “Peter,” please
read on. That is the loophole that I intend to close next.
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employment, and are nonetheless “down” by the workings of
fortune, not fault. That seems to be what our oft invoked
commitments to equal justice, worth, and dignity commit us to, at
the very least. And those commitments all jointly add up, not to a
guaranteed equality of citizens’ ultimate outcomes, of course, since

outcomes impound efforts as well as opportunities, but at least to
equality of real opportunity as suggested above in the Introduction
and Sections 2 and 3.3.159
Surely few will disagree with these truths, which not only
Americans seem to hold “self-evident.”160 What people do
sometimes disagree about are the empirics of actual
responsibility—the comparative degrees to which chance and
choice have determined particular citizens’ particular outcomes.
Practical means of disentangling these intermingling “inputs” to
citizens’ “wealth functions” are proposed elsewhere.161 For present
purposes it will do simply to recall what was discussed above at
Section 3.3. In summary, Section 3.3 proposed that (a) the more
innocent a prospective beneficiary of a share-spreading program,
the less well-endowed that beneficiary already is, and (b) the more
readily viewed as an ethically exogenous resource or material
opportunity a spread item is, the easier it is to perceive publicly
augmented spreading as a redress of ill-fortune. It is easier in such
cases to view public action as vindicating equal opportunity rather
than simply doling handouts. This is even truer when public
augmentation takes the form of tax breaks.162
In this light, one could describe a more generalized variation
on the ESOP, this one geared toward benefiting those in particular
159 See, e.g., sources cited supra headnote. See also Section 3.3., supra (noting
the universality of equality norms).
160 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote at 29–56. That is where I
endeavor to locate an overlapping consensus among our dominant political
traditions—a consensus that converges upon a shared ideal I label that of an
“efficient equal-opportunity republic.” See also Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging,
supra headnote at 142–73 (linking the concepts justice and efficiency); see generally
Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution, supra note 10. The “self-evidence”
remark, of course, alludes to Thomas Jefferson, A Declaration by the Representatives
of the United States of America, in General Congress Assembled, July 4, 1776, in
THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19 (Merril D. Peterson ed., 1984).
161 See Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote at 36–51.
162 See supra Section III.C.
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who are young, lacking in resources, or good citizens who play by
the rules. One could begin by targeting those who benefit their
country or the global polity through something akin to the United
States’ AmeriCorps services.
One could even think about
instituting, perhaps through the U.N., the World Bank, or some
coalition of such institutions, something like a “WorldCorps.”163
Government could readily ensure that beneficiaries meet these
criteria—criteria which will reflect and define the form of
patronage that people believe ethically to underwrite the benefit.164
And one could financially structure the arrangement so as to
ensure that beneficiaries benefit only by working.
Here is how: first, establish a national or multinational trust, a
sort of cross between various nations’ national pension trusts and
the humbler ESOP trust schematized at Section 3. Such a trust
might be called, for example, the national or international “Citizen
Stock Ownership Plan” or “CitSOP” Trust.
Second, open
individual “citizen trusts” or “accounts” for every citizen—
perhaps upon each citizen’s reaching adulthood (in the “accounts”
case), or at birth (in the “trusts” case) as has recently been done in
the U.K.165
These individual CitSOP accounts could be
administered as was envisaged in connection with the “USA”
accounts proposed in the late 1990s by President Clinton, or the
Social Security “personal accounts” proposed somewhat more
recently, or even the accounts proposed by the IMF’s own codesigner, Lord Keynes, nearly 70 years ago.166
163 The United States’ first large-scale post-Homesteading era educationspreading—hence, “human capital” spreading—programs began with veterans as
beneficiaries. Hockett, Hamiltonian Means, supra headnote at 144–46. It would be
fitting to recognize other forms of service in similar ways.
164 Note that we do this already with federal home finance and higher
education assistance. We employ both financial need criteria and law-abidingness
criteria. See id. at 97.
165 I refer to Prime Minister Blair’s Child Trust Fund—or more popularly,
“baby bonds”—a plan implemented in 2001. See Blair Banks On Baby Savings
Scheme, BBC NEWS, Apr. 27, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics
/1297324.stm. Former Senator Bob Kerrey of Nebraska proposed something
similar in the United States at the turn of the past century. His were called
“KidSave Accounts.” See Idea of the Week: KidSave, DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP
COUNCIL, Oct. 13, 2000, http://www.dlc.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=2372&kaid
=131&subid=207.
166 President Clinton proposed “universal savings accounts,” or “USAs,” in
1999. A similar structure of private accounts, now without government income
support, figured into George W. Bush’s 2005 “State of the Union” address. See
generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, HOW TO PAY FOR THE WAR (1940) (describing
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Let the national or multinational CitSOP trust borrow from
lending institutions just as firms’ ESOP trusts do, and let them use
the proceeds of the loans to purchase newly issued, dividendyielding common stock from firms. Grant participating firms and
lending institutions, in turn, more or less the same tax incentives as
they are afforded in connection with US ESOP arrangements. Let
the national or international CitSOP trusts, in turn, pledge the
purchased stock as collateral167 and steadily pay down the debts to
the lenders out of, say, the tax revenue brought in from
participating firms. Let the full set of arrangements, in short, look
something like this:

Keynes’s visionary and, as it turned out, prophetic proposal); President Clinton
Introduces Universal Savings Accounts, INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, Apr. 16,
1999, , available at http://www.ici.org/issues/ret/arc-leg/99_pres_usas.html;
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, President Clinton
Announces USA Accounts, (Apr. 14, 1999), available at http://clinton4.nara.gov
/WH/New/html/19990414-3020.html; Pamela Perun, Matching Private Savings
with Federal Dollars, URBAN INSTITUTE, Nov. 1, 1999, http://www.urban.org
/publications/309272.html (evaluating the effectiveness of Clinton’s USA
Account proposals); RON GEBHARDTSBAUER, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES,
USA
ACCOUNTS,
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/usaccounts.pdf
(reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of the Universal Savings Accounts);
WhiteHouse.gov, Strengthening Social Security for Future Generations,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/social-security (affirming the importance
of reforming Social Security); Bush Pushes Private Accounts, CBS NEWS, May 4, 2005,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/05/04/politics/main692991.shtml?sour
ce=search_story (advocating the idea that private investment accounts created
from Social Security payroll taxes is the best approach). On Keynes’s role in
designing the Fund, see, for example, Hockett, Mission Creep, supra headnote.
167 Though, of course, this also might be deemed unnecessary in the United
States in view of the full faith and credit enjoyed by a federal institution. Indeed,
even were the trust to function as a government sponsored entity (“GSE”), it
would in effect be viewed as being fully 80% as credit-worthy as the federal
government itself for purposes of bank capital adequacy regulation. See RiskBased Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. pt.3 app. A (2008).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

160

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 30:1

FIGURE 5: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A CITSOP
ARRANGEMENT

Firms
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Dividends
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CitSOP
Trust
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This diagram mirrors Figure 1 (or 2 or 3 or 4) again, with some
differing persons and entities—apart from issuing firms and
lenders—involved, in light of the distinct form of patronage being
rewarded. The only complications found here and not in the
previous figures (in the ESOP, CuSOP, RentSOP and
OutsourceSOP cases) concern how precisely the salient patronage
form is to be defined. For example, if one begins with national or
multinational service of some sort as the salient patronage form,
then the amount of stock released over time to the individual
beneficiary’s CitSOP account will track her tenure of service. If, on
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the other hand, law-abiding citizenship itself is the patronage
category, then stock amounts will rise simply with years of
citizenship—just as one’s U.S. Social Security or cognate national
pension benefit elsewhere (for example, Chile168) rises with time
spent at work.
One might also stratify patronage subtypes in this case, such
that law-abiding citizenship alone entitles the beneficiary to some
basic minimum of stock released per quarter, national or
international service of one sort entitles her to some amount more,
national or international service of another sort entitles her to a yet
larger increment more, and so on. Finally, insofar as opportunity
deficits are of concern, one might “needs test” one or more of the
benefits here, perhaps applying a graduated discount factor to
entitled benefits as personal wealth rises.169 One would then
consider “disemployment” by an “outsourcing” firm itself to
constitute such a need, in effect growing the CitSOP directly out of
the OutsourceSOP. In such a case, one would presumably verify
eligibility by means similar to those employed presently in
connection with statutory “adjustment relief.”170
There are many variations and gradations to consider and
evaluate, as the aim here is to establish the plausibility and
attractiveness of the general idea rather than to lock into one
particular blueprint. The important points for present purposes,
then, are more fundamental in nature: The first is that the basic
model can perspicuously accommodate any form of patronage—
any form of ethically deserving status such as might politically
sanction benefit conferral—that can be envisaged. The second
point is that it can do so while conferring benefits in a manner that
both (a) spreads firm ownership, and (b) does so by means that
respect both people’s core values and their endowment sensibilities
as rehearsed above in Section 3.3.
168 For a good sampling of the aims, ambitions and operations of various
national pension programs, see, for example, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSIONS:
PRINCIPLES, POLICIES, AND INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE (Salvador Valdes-Prieto ed.,
1997)
169 A limiting case, then, might be that of the offspring of wealthy families,
who perhaps would not qualify for any benefit of this particular (CitSOP) sort. It
might, however, on the other hand be deemed preferable not to “needs test” at all,
on more or less the same political popularity grounds as ground the U.S.
Supplemental Security Income’s abstention from needs testing.
170 See supra note 137 and accompanying text (discussing adjustment relief
through taxation).
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The third point is that trade and investment liberalization may
be conditioned upon participation by other nations in multilateral
programs which require only well-to-do “Marys,” not erstwhile
penurious “Pauls,” to share the surpluses they derive from
globalizations with recently and faultlessly “outsourced” “Peters.”
Continued globalization could thus be conditioned upon everyone
gaining.
And finally the fourth point, which will be treated more
thoroughly in the following subsection, is that the national or
international CitSOP idea fans out naturally into a broader
consideration that deserves a bit more discussion: the fact that the
“Peters” who elicit our concern, possessing as they generally do
only one, comparatively undiversifiable form of capital—”human
capital”—are inherently subject to more income risk than are the
“Marys,” whose firm-share-holdings are readily diversified. Might
we work to render our compensated “Peter’s” new capital form as
secure as “Mary’s”?
5.3. Addressing the Risks of Ownership: Portfolio-Diversifying SOP
Mutuals
One particular advantage enjoyed by the CitSOP idea that is
not enjoyed to the same degree by the CuSOP, RentSOP and single
firm OutsourceSOP ideas is the automaticity of the CitSOP’s
diversification of acquired stocks. If a broad variety of firms
nationally or transnationally participate in the CitSOP program,
beneficiaries could perforce receive shares in a broad array of
firms.
In the earlier-rehearsed CuSOP, RentSOP and
OutsourceSOP cases, by contrast, diversification would ride upon
more accidental factors. These factors include, for example, the
number of different corporate firms that the particular beneficiary
regularly patronized as a customer (voluntarily, involuntarily or in
between), the number of such rent-extracting firms in more or less
close proximity to where the beneficiary lived, or the number of
firms—typically only one—for which the beneficiary labored.
How, then, might one design SOP-like or SOP-complementing
arrangements that optimally diversify holdings among all SOP
beneficiaries irrespective of SOP-type?
Once again, a variety of methods might be employed.
Consider two very simple, exemplary models. The first model
might appropriately be called the “SOP Mutual.” Various SOP
trusts would convey their primary issuer stock holdings to an
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intermediary, which in return would convey shares in itself of
equal value to the trusts.171 The intermediary (and now secondary
issuer) would be, in effect, a mutual fund whose (initial) members
were SOP trusts.172 Subsequently the SOP trusts would, rather
than gradually releasing sponsoring issuers’ securities to their
beneficiaries’ individual accounts over time, release SOP Mutual
shares instead. Shares of the latter sort also would serve, where
shares collateralize loans used for the purchase of primary issuer
stock, in place of the latter as collateral. Diagramatically, then,
things would look thus:

171
See generally TOM COPELAND ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND
MANAGING THE VALUE OF COMPANIES 131–297 (3d ed. 2000) (describing cash flow
valuation). Individual issuer shares would be valued as are any issuer’s—by “the
market” in the case of publicly valued firms, pursuant to the “cashflow” method
in the case of closely held firms. Id. I ignore here the question of means of
avoiding imprecisions occasioned by market fluctuations, accounting
indeterminacies, etc., as there seem to be no difficulties specific to the present case
and not already dealt with by familiar means in other investment company
contexts.
172 This would also hold true for SOP trust beneficiaries.
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FIGURE 6: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH
SOP MUTUAL ARRANGEMENT
Firms
(“Primary
Issuers”)

Newly Issued
Common Stock

Guaranty of
Trust Note
Dividends
$ Proceeds
$ Loan

SOP
Trust

Promissory Note, Mutual
(“Secondary”) Shares as Collateral

Lending
Institutions

Timely Repayment
Secondary Issuer
(Mutual) Shares
Primary Issuer (Firm) Shares
Mutual Stock as
Debt is Paid Down

Individual
SOP
Accounts

SOP Mutual
(“Secondary
Issuer”)

It is worth noting here that the SOP Trusts participating in SOP
Mutual arrangements could be of all types—ESOPs, CuSOPs,
RentSOPs, OutsourceSOPs, even CitSOPs, were there good
reason.173 And the more SOP types and SOPs, of course, the
greater the degree of diversity, hence the lesser quantum of value
at risk, that would be faced by SOP beneficiaries—or “Peters.”
Such a hybrid approach would yield the “best of both worlds,” so

173 For example, were an insufficient variety of firm types participating in
CitSOP arrangements.
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to speak. It would both foster patronage relations between persons
and firms—since benefits ride upon such relations—and dissipate
the income-risk that attends patronage-concentration.
An advantage of the SOP Mutual model is that it enables SOP
beneficiaries—not to mention lenders whose loans are
collateralized by SOP Trust-held stocks—to reap the benefits of
diversification even before they become legal, as distinguished
from beneficial, owners. If, however, it became necessary to forgo
that advantage for some reason, it would be possible to mutualize
at the individual beneficiary level rather than at the SOP Trust
level. One might, for example, condition qualification for the SOP
benefit upon the agreement of beneficiaries to diversify their
holdings for some period of time. Alternatively, one might tax
gains differently upon individually owned primary issues and
secondary (mutual) stock. What seems more likely is a gradually
growing degree of financial understanding enjoyed by citizens
holding gradually growing portfolios of securities174 that
presumably would prompt SOP beneficiaries to better diversify
their legally owned holdings. Government might even provide,
facilitate, or otherwise encourage the provision of such counseling.
In all events, diagrammatically things would look rather as
they do in Figure 5, save that now arrows would link not SOP
Trusts and SOP Mutuals, but individual SOP beneficiaries and
ordinary mutual funds:

174 We might even subsidize or require—the latter perhaps in the form of
benefit conditionality— some baseline degree of financial counseling, as we do in
the case of our federal home- and education-finance programs. See Hockett,
Jeffersonian Republic, supra headnote, at 112, 151 (comparing federal home and
education financing assistance).
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FIGURE 7: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH
PRIVATELY ACHIEVED DIVERSIFICATION
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And one might imagine, of course, ordinary mutual funds
serving both in their current capacities and as SOP Mutuals:

FIGURE 8: INSTITUTIONAL/FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF A SOP WITH
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SOP MUTUAL ARRANGEMENT AND PRIVATELY ACHIEVED
DIVERSIFICATION

Firms
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There seems no reason, then, why we might not achieve
optimal diversification among our increasingly owning citizens
even while rewarding their multiple ongoing patronage relations
with a perhaps somewhat lesser variety of firms.
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A ROLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE

Everything described and discussed in Section 5 implicates
the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the “New
International Financial Architecture” that they have been busily
constructing since the mid-1940s.175 A possible problem at this
juncture, however, is that it does not implicate them solely in one
way. What role or roles the IFIs should play—and indeed which
IFIs should play a role—will rest largely on the structure and
institutionalization of a system of OutsourceSOP arrangements,
CitSOP arrangements, or both. This Article has thus far repeatedly
abstained from committing to any one way of proceeding with
these arrangements, in view of its exploratory, “thoughtexperimenting” nature.
Perhaps the best way to think about the role of the IFIs in a
manner that coheres with this Article’s purposes, then, is to divide
the inquiry into two stages. The first stage will note a few reasons
of a general nature as to why and how the IFIs are implicated. For
what can be said here will both (a) be applicable to any particular
role or set of roles envisaged for the IFIs, and (b) delimit how we
can more specifically envisage those roles themselves. In the
second stage, this Article will sketch out the role of the IFIs a bit
more specifically. This paper, however, will aim to do so in broad
enough outline as to remain appropriately open to the plurality of
options presented by the “thought experimenting” done in Section
5.
6.1. How the IFIs are Constitutionally Implicated
The proposals envisaged in Section 5 are all, at their most basic,
financial in nature. They are also designed with a view to better
apportioning the benefits and burdens of globalization. The
central idea is to spread ethically exogenous benefits and burdens
more equitably, in keeping with core opportunity-egalitarian
values as laid out in Sections 2 and 3.3. The aim is also to do so, in
keeping with methods-constraining endowment dispositions as
briefly rehearsed in Section 3.3, via the mechanisms through which
175 More on this history infra, text accompanying notes 179–85. See generally
Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote; Hockett, Global Macro-Hedging, supra
headnote.
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globalization-benefited business firms finance themselves. By taxbreak-assisting corporate debt-finance in return for corporate
share-spreading—which of course is financial capital-spreading—
or by conditioning firms’ receipt of rent-like benefits—such as
those occasioned by globalization—upon share-spreading, the SOP
plans do something that is just as financial as it is ethically and
intuitively attractive: they harness finance and globalization
themselves to spread globalization’s own financial benefits more
widely. The benefits themselves, to repeat, are as financial in
nature as could be: they are corporate securities.
Now precisely for these reasons, the suggestions made in
Section 5 fall squarely within what I have argued in a number of
other venues to comprise the emerging mandate of the principal
IFIs—the Bretton Woods institutions in particular.176 What is
meant by “emerging mandate” here? Well, two things—one fairly
broad, the other more narrow in sweep. Broadly speaking, the
IFIs’ legally mandated and pragmatically necessary role is to
facilitate sustainable global economic integration.
More
specifically, it is to do so from that integration process’s specifically
financial nodes.177 This is, of course, a complex and evolving
mandate, not least because global financial markets and practices
themselves are both highly complex and now rapidly evolving.178
Now this mandate originally involved the IMF in overseeing
and maintaining the global currency regime upon which product
market integration depended.179 It involved the IBRD in financing
postwar reconstruction and new infrastructure development, both
directly and indirectly.180 Since the 1970s, 1980s and, especially, the
later 1990s, the mandate has steadily come to involve rather more
for all of the IFIs. And that has been largely in owing precisely to
the IFIs’—and indeed globalization’s—successes in carrying out the
mandates’ earlier stages.
The Fund’s ongoing global financial market monitoring roles,
as well as its comparatively recent domestic structural adjustments,
have been steadily transforming it into a critical determinant of the
176

97.

See generally sources cited supra headnote, para. 2. See also infra notes 177–

See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote.
Id.
179 Id.
180
“Indirectly” by effectively encouraging private lending in addition to
supplying funds directly. See id.; Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
177
178
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legal and regulatory infrastructures not only of cross-border
financial transactions, but unavoidably of domestic financial
arrangements as well.181 The Bank, for its part, has come
increasingly—and again, unavoidably—to treat domestic pension
and social insurance arrangements as critical components of the
infrastructures that must be formed for steady economic
development.182
All of these developments were, at least in broad outline, both
foreseeable and indeed foreseen during the founding era of the IFIs
in the mid-1940s. Thus, they were legally provided for in the
constitutive documents, acts, and shared understandings from
which the institutions grew.183 The founders recognized, and
actively sought, the gradual integration of world product and
service markets. They promoted this integration in the interests of
greater prosperity among, and closer integration between national
societies themselves.184 Accordingly, they also saw the need for a
pragmatically adjustable role for international collaboration in the
realms of finance and its regulation, partly because financial
services themselves engage in trade. More importantly, finance,
financial markets, and financial products are critically
determinative of the operation, integration, and stable sustainable
growth of markets generally.185
Now it would seem that the prospects considered just above in
Section 5 fall quite squarely within this same province, both as a
prudential and as an ethical matter. Prudentially speaking, and as
noted in Section 1, global trade and investment liberalization
181 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 156–57 (detailing how and
why the International Monetary Fund has moved from focusing solely on strictly
macro-economic concerns to also involving issues such as domestic bankruptcy
laws, corporate policies, and political governance); see also Hockett, Gestalt-Switch,
supra headnote (illustrating potential ways that IFIs could benefit individuals
instead of just macro-economic actors).
182 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 191 (noting changes in the
Bank’s system of assessment of necessary economic infrastructure); see also
Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote, at 121 (supporting the IMF and the Bank in
their recognition of effective social-insurance programs following the Asian
Financial Crisis and the Argentine meltdown).
183 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 177–89 (analyzing the
IMF’s Articles of Agreement).
184 Id. at 162 (describing how “relations between aggregate wealth, trade, and
money” gave rise to IFIs).
185 See generally Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote (suggesting that the
IMF’s focus on domestic markets is actually in line with the founders’ original
goals).
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appear to have entered more turbulent political waters in the last
decade or so. The process’s perceived “losers” have been growing
more numerous, more vocal, or both. And it seems they are
beginning to be heard and heeded—not just by activists and
agitators, but by leaders and legislators as well. If the process of
global economic integration is to continue, and we are to avoid
backsliding into a 1930s-style retrenchment, then we should
increase the number of stakeholders among those who are growing
both more disenfranchised and more disenchanted.
Sections 3 through 5 suggest that one ethically attractive and
intuitively satisfying means of making more stakeholders is
creating more shareholders within the very firms that now benefit
by globalization. This kind of stake is of course financial, in that
shares are financial assets and the proposed means for spreading
these shares are financial as well. So both in respect of ends—
sustaining continued global market integration by better spreading
its financial benefits—and in respect of financial engineering
means—the proposals above clearly implicate the IFIs’ developing
mandates. Generally, this is what is meant by asserting that the IFIs
are implicated by this Article’s proposals.
What is meant specifically? As argued elsewhere, the proper
roles of the IFIs in facilitating sustainable global economic
integration can be helpfully schematized as falling within any of
four quadrants formed by two axes.186 The first axis runs between
so-called “programs” and “policies.” This divide is rooted in the
structures of the IFIs’ enabling treaties themselves. It principally
involves the IFIs in developing “policies” to encourage and
facilitate particular kinds of member state “programs.”187
The second axis runs between what are well individuated as
“opportunity” and “risk.” These amount to the financial faces of
globalization’s aforementioned “benefits” and “burdens,”
respectively.188 This axis is rooted, not in the IFIs’ enabling treaties,
but simply in the functional roles played by finance in human
affairs.189 And the IFIs’ mandates are best interpreted as charges to
186 See generally Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote (suggesting ways that
IFIs could benefit individuals instead of just macro-economic actors).
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 On the benefit side, finance amounts to opportunity in the quite literal
sense that it enables people, through the exercise of diligence, to “make real” their
potentially value-adding ideas. In effect, this is precisely what micro-loans, small
business loans, corporate finance, and venture capital finance all amount to. On
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the IFIs to adopt policies encouraging and facilitating state
programs that not only increase opportunity and decrease risk, but
that also work specifically to spread what this Article has called
“ethically exogenous” opportunity and risk.190
The program/policy and opportunity/risk axes form four
quadrants according to which many opportunity and risk
spreading state programs, encouraged and facilitated by specific
IFI policies, can be classified.191 For example, land reform, basic
health, literacy, and education programs carried out within states
are, of course, ethically exogenous opportunity-spreading
programs. The Bank in particular has developed policies in favor
of encouraging and indeed facilitating such programs.192 The
Fund’s and the Bank’s developing interests in eradicating
corruption and even in fostering democracy, both in governments
and in corporate governance, can likewise be so interpreted.193
Social insurance programs run by states amount to ethically
exogenous risk-spreading programs.
And the IFIs’ recent
attentions to “social safety nets” amount to IFI policy
developments along these lines.194
Additional market-based
programs are proposed in other venues.195

the burden side, finance amounts to a means of trading, sharing, or more thinly
spreading what would otherwise be thickly concentrated risk. This, of course, is
one reason why insurance companies are considered to be financial institutions. It
is also, of course, quite clearly observed not only in derivative and other hedging
markets, but even in the more garden variety corporate securities markets
themselves, a principal role of which is to assist firms’ owners in diversifying their
investments and thus lessening their financial risks. See generally ROBERT
HOCKETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND
FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2008).
190 See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote, at 193 (suggesting that IFIs
could work to achieve global distributive justice by harnessing international
financial markets); Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote (supporting the IMF and
the Bank in their recognition of effective social-insurance programs following the
Asian financial crisis and the Argentine meltdown).
191 Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote.
See also Hockett, Global MacroHedging, supra headnote (arguing that profit distribution remains inequitable
despite increasing globalization, and suggesting and evaluating methods to
change this); Robert Hockett, Gaming as Microinsurance (2008) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
192 See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote, at 195 (describing the Bank’s
facilitation of state programs for project development).
193 Id. at 195–96.
194 Id.
195 See Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote.
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Where do the SOP suggestions of Section 5 fit in? To a degree,
they straddle the boundaries, occupying portions of all four
quadrants, which renders them especially good candidates for IFI
concern. It means they are cognizable by the IFIs from all vantagepoints of their mandates. These observations are perhaps most
obvious with respect to the opportunity/risk axis, where the
straddle is conceptually inevitable (this will be shown in a
moment). On the other hand, with respect to the program/policy
axis, the straddle is specifically contingent upon the pending
decision after Section 5 as to how things should proceed.
Accordingly, it is best to briefly review the opportunity/risk axis,
leaving the matter of program and policy to a fuller consideration
in Section 6.2.
An opportunity and risk straddle in the case of the SOP plans
of Section 5 means that spreading shares in globalization-benefited
firms to faultless outsourced “Peters” includes both ethically
exogenous risk and ethically exogenous opportunity. Peter no
longer needs to bear this risk—which is, again, by hypothesis
ethically exogenous196—alone. The risk to people like Peter—who
might, when too old fully to retool, unforeseeably lose income in
consequence of sudden hiring of desperate “Pauls” who can work
for much lower pay in much poorer countries with much lower
costs of living—is now mitigated. It is mitigated by compensation
paid to Peter by Mary, who has benefited by luck and must share
some of her windfall gains. So the presently concentrated burdens
wrought by globalization are diluted and spread out, as are the
concentrated windfall gains gleaned by Mary.
The aforementioned benefit spreading, which here takes the
form of share spreading, also amounts to a form of ethically
exogenous opportunity spreading. It is opportunity-spreading in
the straightforward sense that to own shares in firms which benefit
by globalization is to own shares in future profits. “Peters” will
glean future dividends, capital gains, or both, which they would
not have gleaned before. They might even use some of these to
finance “retooling” of themselves through vocational training, if
they are young enough to be able to employ the new skills. Sharespreading of this sort also is ethically exogenous opportunity-

196

That is what we mean in calling him “faultless.” See supra, Sections 2, 3.3.
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spreading. It is so in the straightforward sense that it is financed,
in effect, by recouping some of the windfall gains gleaned by the
“Marys.”
The SOP structures described in Section 5 facilitate the sharing
of ethically exogenous opportunity and risk across persons in a
manner that both increases the number of stakeholders in, and
decreases the injustices wrought by, global economic integration.
It is precisely the sort of mission shown elsewhere to fall well
within the bailiwick of proper IFI concern.197
But now, what form of IFI concern? How is the concern to be
manifest? Are the SOP arrangements described in Section 5 best
viewed as a state “program,” which IFIs should adopt “policies” to
encourage and perhaps facilitate? Or are we instead considering
the sort of program that either must, or should, be administered by
some transnational institution or institutions, including one or
more of the IFIs? That question requires consideration of precisely
what role the IFIs are apt to play in any global SOPs program. It is
tempting to suggest that “path dependence,” determined in part by
already existent analogical precedent and in part by an already
developing institutional backdrop, is fitting to play an influential
role.
6.2. How IFIs are Programmatically Implicated
There seems no question that the IFIs both (a) have good
reason, and (b) are authorized, to take interest in the prospect of a
global SOPs program. Hence the principal remaining question is
what form that interest should take. Given the particular interests
at stake and the institutional environment already in place, it
seems likely that the principal role for the IFIs will be: first,
inventive and advocative; second, coordinative; and third,
monitory. The remainder of this Section will explain these roles
and their likelihood.
However, in keeping with the more
“thought-experimenting” aims of this Article, the prospect that IFI
involvement might take some other shape should be left open.
First, then, the IFIs should undertake to design, and urge their
members domestically to initiate OutsourceSOPs and perhaps even
CitSOPs as well. Second, they should propose, host, and facilitate
international cooperation in coordinating SOP policies across
197 See generally Hockett, Gestalt-Switch, supra headnote; Hockett, Three Pillars,
supra headnote.
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jurisdictions in a manner encouraging safe participation and
diversification of holdings by SOP beneficiaries. Third, the IFIs
should add, to their already active surveillance agendas, the
regulation and monitoring of SOP trusts. They should do this with
a view to protecting beneficiaries and third parties from familiar
forms of exploitation and expropriation by opportunistic
fiduciaries, pursuant to their now accustomed role in facilitating
coordinated finance-regulatory policies worldwide.
In employing ordinal—”first,” “second,” “third”—terminology
here, the aim is to convey not just expository ordering, but also
literal programmatically temporal ordering.
The order of
exposition is not only heuristically natural, but also replicates the
optimal sequencing of IFI involvement in any global SOP’s agenda.
But why should the IFIs design or advocate here at all? Do
individual member states—particularly those with substantial
populations of “Peters”—not already face sufficient incentives to
institute systems of OutsourceSOPs and even CitSOPs? After all,
their “Peters” are unjustly deprived of work opportunities by
outsourcing, made possible by their treaties. It is their function to
facilitate exogenous opportunity and risk sharing among their own
citizens. What need is there for the IFIs to “incentivize,” then?
Furthermore, are states, in addition to being already
adequately incentivized, also capable of implementing SOP
programs on their own, state by state? States themselves must
encourage SOP financing on the part of firms by trimming their tax
take from firms that do so, or by conditioning trade liberalization
on share issuance to outsourced employees as described in Section
5. Moreover, it is presumably states that will have to determine
what citizens qualify for the benefit, as is currently the case with
more familiar adjustment assistance.198 Finally, there is already an
extensive infrastructure of bank trust departments and investment
companies—mutual funds in particular—that seem most likely to
supply the SOP-requisite trust accounts,199 and these operate under
domestic regulatory arrangements.
The reply to all of these questions and observations is, of
course, yes. States’ preexisting incentives and capabilities to
implement their own SOP programs are helpful because that
means that they can begin designing and instituting such programs

198
199

See supra note 141, and accompanying text.
We are not apt to wish to “reinvent the wheel” here.
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as these to render globalization more unambiguously good for
their citizenries, without having to wait for others to do so.200
Furthermore, states will play a critical role, per familiar principles
of subsidiarity, even in any eventual global SOPs infrastructure.201
Nevertheless, complications arise which militate in favor of IFI
entry.
Most simply and generally, it will be much better for the cause
of sustainable globalization for all states with sizable populations of
“Peters” to design and institute SOP-type arrangements of the kind
sketched above in Section 5. That is so both for the justice- and
prudence-based reasons laid out in Sections 2 and 3.3, and for the
more globalization-specific reasons discussed above in Section 6.1.
“More” is straightforwardly “better.”202 Additionally, the IFIs,
whose first mission is to facilitate precisely such continued
globalization, bear a natural interest in encouraging members to do
domestically what is necessary to further that transnational
purpose. This is precisely why they encourage, as noted above in
6.1, the development of “social safety nets” such as OutsourceSOP
and CitSOP.
Furthermore, within some polities, “Marys” might be as
influential as “Peters,” if not more so. Their perceived selfinterests might not in all cases be “enlightened.” Moreover, many
“Peters” in many jurisdictions might believe that their only remedy
from continued outsourcing is to push back against globalization
itself. They might not realize that there are more direct and more
carefully tailored, less globalization-threatening means of
addressing their justified complaints that don’t “throw the baby
out with the bathwater.”
Accordingly, while the IFIs set or influence the agenda within
polities where “everyone gains,” the Section 5 SOP solution has not
yet been achieved or gone mainstream. But by adding a salutary
voice within polities, and moreover, by adding an impartial,
transnational voice, the IFIs can play a critical role in the
200 Hence my proposals in Hockett, Of ESOPs, supra headnote at 885–97
(arguing that an ESOP is a “tentative, but incomplete” step towards disseminating
the benefits of globalization to all citizens).
201 Id.
202 See generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote (detailing
“straightforward betterness”); Robert Hockett, Market Completeness, Market
Neutrality, and Ethically Cognizable Efficiency: An Ordinal Equivalence Theorem
(2008) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (formalizing the proof of this
claim).
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popularizing and spreading of SOP programs worldwide. Again,
that in turn will facilitate the stable and steady continuance of
equitably distributed market-integration to which the IFIs are, so to
speak, constitutionally committed.203
It also bears emphasis that some of the assumptions embedded
in the questions introduced in the present discussion require more
nuance to avoid being misleading. And this takes us directly to the
second role that the IFIs will likely play in connection with the
instituting of any global SOPs program that moves beyond mere
advocating.
Here, then, is the proverbial rub: national governments may
encourage actual tax breaks or require conditional SOP-financing
by firms. They will also, in all likelihood, monitor beneficiary
status claimants of SOP programs, with a view to those claimants’
bona fide “faultlessly outsourced” status. Finally, there is already
an extensive, privately provided infrastructure of bank trust
departments
and
investment
companies
in
place—an
infrastructure apt to be utilized in the creation of SOP trust
accounts and SOP beneficiary accounts. But, owing to the success
of IFI-facilitated global financial market integration itself, what
individual states do vis-à-vis the financing of firms and the
operating of financial intermediaries increasingly affects persons
residing beyond their borders.204
General Motors, Microsoft, and Unisys, for example, are not
owned solely by American “Marys.” Nor are Daimler, Phillips, or
Unilever owned solely by Europeans, nor are Toyota and Sony
exclusively owned by Japanese. Firms increasingly offer and sell
their shares worldwide. Additionally, savings and investment
portfolios increasingly are held across borders.205 This means,
among other things, that what a particular state encourages or
requires of firms under its jurisdiction increasingly affects nonnationals as well as nationals.
That in turn means that non-national “Marys” over whom a
government lacks jurisdiction might feel differently than national

203 That is to say, by their enabling treaties, whose mandates as enshrined in
their constitutive documents.
204 See, e.g., HAL SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 863–85 (13th ed., 2006)
(evaluating the increased demand for international solutions in an increasingly
dependent world).
205 Id. at 17 (proving that cross-border savings and investment has increased
dramatically).
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“Marys” about having to share gains with national “Peters”—
especially if it is easier for national “Peters” to gain beneficiary
status than the “Peters” in “Mary’s” own nation. It also means that
nationally and non-nationally located firms can fare differently as
“Marys” “vote with their feet” and move their investment moneys.
Differential faring of this sort is inimical to the ideals of global
market integration. What is more, differences in treatment of
primary-issuing firms and financial intermediaries nation-bynation discourage global diversification of holdings.
Such
diversification is a necessary predicate to optimal asset security
among the world’s shareholders.
Presumably, we need not continue with this line of
observations for present purposes. The idea seems clear enough:
for a global SOPs plan to be widely experienced, be appreciated as
fair, and to work optimally, it will have to treat all global “Peters”
and “Marys” as similarly and impartially as possible. That means
that there is a role for impartial international organizations to
coordinate efforts among nations in order to harmonize
substantive standards and procedural implementation. Of course,
this is yet another role that the IFIs—especially the IMF now—
already play.206
Insofar as globalization is truly a global community project,
and insofar as this project implicates something like a global SOPs
program to smooth and thus underwrite the project’s continuance,
it calls for coordinative assistance given such programs by the same
institutions that assist in coordinating the other policies, programs
and processes of global integration. In the present context, that
means the IFIs. In addition to advocating the coordinated
adoption of SOP programs by member states, and supporting the
design and fine-tuning of such programs through their research
and related expertise, the IFIs will do something else: they will
also constitute natural forums for coordinating, which includes the
coordinating of substantive standards, implementary, and
operational strategies, and the like. With respect to the SOP form
of global social insurance, they will do what they already do with
respect to global finance—regulatory architecture.207 This takes us
206 See generally Hockett, Three Pillars, supra headnote, at 105 (describing the
IFIs’ role in balancing the concerns of equal treatment and market optimization).
207 See generally Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra headnote (detailing the
interactions between social insurance and financial regulation); ROBERT HOCKETT,
FINANCE, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (forthcoming 2008).
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straight to the third and final “phase” of the most likely course of
sequenced IFI involvement.
Perhaps above all else, the kind of coordinating that many of
the IFIs and especially the IMF do now is coordinating
regulation.208 The financial services industry, as we have long
known, is particularly vulnerable to occasional outbreaks of
mutually reinforcing hyper-speculative and opportunistic behavior
on the part both of fiduciaries and of others who trade on their
own accounts. At times, some of these people find the temptation
to make a quick buck—typically through sophisticated means not
readily detectable even by experienced regulators let alone
uninformed, inexpert clients—difficult to resist. When such things
happen, not only can innocent parties’ life savings be wiped out
with little more than a keystroke or two, but systemic third party
effects can be devastating as well.209
It is precisely because of the special vulnerability of inexpert
clients, the systemic effects on the wider economy and thus
uninvolved third parties, and the high money stakes that many
traditionally anti-regulatory, politically “conservative” personages
now recognize the need for at least financial regulation.210 Together
with the need to coordinate regulatory strategies in a world whose
financial markets are now integrated even while regulation
remains national and polycentric, these reasons underwrite the role
of the IFIs in researching, developing, and facilitating the smooth
operation of the global finance-regulatory architecture.
One can see where this is going: A global SOPs program
would make substantial shareholders of a vastly large number of
people worldwide. Firms worldwide will increasingly come to be
owned, in varying amounts, by virtually all of the world’s adult
inhabitants. Their shares will be held and managed by financial
intermediaries, which will accordingly hold power and face
temptations of kinds quite familiar but on a scale vastly larger than
before. A global shareholder society will also be a global riskSee generally Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote.
For a particularly recent example, witness the current turmoil across
financial markets generally rooted in the particular decisions of a few overeager
subprime mortgage lenders several years ago. Such examples can, of course, be
proliferated from decade to decade.
210 See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 577-78 (3rd ed.,
2003) (asserting that, even under the Reagan administration and its generally
more anti-regulatory position, the SEC experienced a “staggering” increase its in
workload).
208
209
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bearing society: a society of persons at risk of financial predation.
To build such a society, in the end, is worth the risk, but only
insofar as the risk can be mitigated along lines developed by
domestic authorities over the past fifty years or so.
The final role of the IFIs in connection with any global SOPs
program will be a straightforward extension of—or rather, an
augmentation of—what probably is their best known role. In a
world that increasingly comes to look like a global shareholder
society—in which national citizens transnationally hold shares in
transnational firms in accounts with transnationally operating
financial intermediaries—the IFIs will have to assist national
regulators in protecting their shareholder citizens, as well as the
global financial system qua system. When we get there, of course,
things will look much as they do now, “only more so.”
7.

CONCLUSION: OUR COMING GLOBAL SHAREHOLDER SOCIETY

A good bit of ground has been covered here, doubtless more
than enough to warrant leaving off for the present. Perhaps
ironically, however, these issues have only begun to be addressed.
For as mentioned a number of times already over the course of this
Article, the aim has been more exploratory than flatly advocative.
The processes of global market integration have been
remarkably successful to date, particularly when measured against
the backdrop of those world conditions that sent visionary world
leaders like Maynard Keynes and Harry White, in the mid-1940s,
upon the course ultimately taken.211 Those processes also have
brought many benefits to many people, and continue to do so—
including not only many of the world’s hitherto most
disadvantaged people, but also its most unjustly disadvantaged
people.
But global market integration is also occasioning losses—
including unjust losses. Until we get serious about developing
means to address these, the world is apt not only to remain less just
than it could be, but also to fall prey to backsliding in the
unsatisfactory direction from whence we have but recently come.212
It seems clear that the best means of addressing these losses—
”best” as measured both against our motivating core ideals and
211 See Hockett, Macro to Micro, supra headnote, at 165–68 (discussing the
proposals of Keynes and White and the resulting Bretton Woods institutions).
212 Two words come to mind here: “Smoot-Hawley.”
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against our feasibility-constraining endowment sensibilities
discussed above in Sections 2 and 3.3—are financial in nature.
It also seems clear that, just as globalization is a global project,
so is the project of rendering globalization more just and
sustainable. It is a project in which global institutions must play a
critical role. Because it is preeminently a financial project, it is a
project in which our global financial institutions and global
financial architecture in particular will play a critical role.
The precise contours of these roles will ride in part upon the
contours of the programs ultimately devised. But I hope to have
sketched out a plausible direction in which that devising might
proceed. By way of a last, parting thought for the moment, think
of what it will mean should this succeed: it will be the attainment
of a goal that has long been the dream not only of internationalists,
but even of more domestically oriented advocates of a just and
sustainable economic order. The foundations will be laid for a
global society in which all members partake, as part-owners, of the
means by which prosperity is generated. There will be no more
need of division between classes. Nor will there be need of
“protectionist” resurgences or Seattle-style riots. “Globalization”
will again be embraceable by idealists, not just by “offshoring”
entrepreneurs in search of extractable surplus.
Like it or not, everyone is a global stakeholder. The idea of this
Article is to make this inescapable stakeholding not only more
bearable, but more just and indeed even fulfilling, by making
everyone global shareholders as well.
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